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We introduce an extension of Strategy Logic for the imperfect-information setting, called SLii, and study its
model-checking problem. As this logic naturally captures multi-player games with imperfect information,
this problem is undecidable; but we introduce a syntactical class of “hierarchical instances” for which, in-
tuitively, as one goes down the syntactic tree of the formula, strategy quantifications are concerned with
finer observations of the model, and we prove that model-checking SLii restricted to hierarchical instances
is decidable. This result, because it allows for complex patterns of existential and universal quantification
on strategies, greatly generalises the decidability of distributed synthesis for systems with hierarchical infor-
mation. It allows us to easily derive new decidability results concerning strategic problems under imperfect
information such as the existence of Nash equilibria, or rational synthesis.
To establish this result we go through an intermediary, “low-level” logic much more adapted to automata
techniques. QCTL∗ is an extension of CTL∗ with second-order quantification over atomic propositions that
has been used to study strategic logics with perfect information. We extend it to the imperfect information
setting by parameterising second-order quantifiers with observations. The simple syntax of the resulting
logic, QCTL∗ii, allows us to provide a conceptually neat reduction of SLii to QCTL
∗
ii that separates concerns,
allowing one to forget about strategies and players and focus solely on second-order quantification.While the
model-checking problem ofQCTL∗ii is, in general, undecidable, we identify a syntactic fragment of hierarchical
formulas and prove, using an automata-theoretic approach, that it is decidable.
We apply our result to solve complex strategic problems in the imperfect-information setting. We first
show that the existence of Nash equilibria for deterministic strategies is decidable in games with hierarchical
information. We also introduce distributed rational synthesis, a generalisation of rational synthesis to the
imperfect-information setting. Because it can easily be expressed in our logic, our main result provides a
solution to this problem in the case of hierarchical information.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Temporal logics such as LTL [67] or CTL∗ [28] are extremely successful logics that have been stud-
ied in great detail and extended in many directions along the past decades, notably in relation with
the development of the model-checking approach to program verification [22]. When considering
systems with multiple components such as multi-agent systems or distributed programs, popular
extensions of temporal logics are the family of so-called logics for strategic reasoning, or strategic
logics, which introduce operators that can express the existence of strategies for components to
ensure that the system’s executions satisfy certain temporal properties.
A fundational logic in this family is Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [1]. It extends
CTL∗ with a coalition operator 〈A〉φ, where A is a subset of components/agents of the system,
which reads as “coalition A has a strategy to enforce property φ no matter what the other com-
ponents/agents do”. This logic is thus quite expressive, as it allows for instance to express the
existence of winning strategies in games played on graphs. However it is not well suited to reason
about other important solution concepts in game theory, such as Nash equilibria. To address this
problem Strategy Logic (SL) was introduced [20, 60]. In SL strategies are treated as first-order ob-
jects, thanks to strategy variables x that can be quantified upon and bound to players: 〈〈x〉〉 reads
as “there exists a strategy x”, and (a, x) reads as “strategy x is assigned to player a”. This leads to
a very expressive logic that can express many solution concepts from game-theory such as best
response, existence of Nash equilibria or subgame-perfect equilibria.
Imperfect information. An essential property of realistic multi-player games is that players
often have a limited view of the system. Such imperfect information, or partial observation, is
usually captured by equipping the models with equivalence relations o (called observations) over
the state space, that specify indistinguishable states. Strategies are then required to be uniform,
i.e., they cannot assign different moves to indistinguishable situations. Imperfect information is
known to make games computationally harder to solve. For two-player reachability games, Reif
showed in [73] that deciding the existence of winning strategies is Exptime-complete for imperfect
information, while it is in Ptime for perfect information. This result has later been generalised to
omega-regular objectives [7, 26], and adapted to the setting of program synthesis from temporal
specifications [49, 68]. In the case of multiple players/components/agents, which interests us here,
the situation is even worse: the existence of distributed winning strategies is undecidable already
for two players with incomparable observation trying to enforce some reachability objective in the
presence of an adversarial third player [65], and a similar result was also proved in the framework
of distributed synthesis [69]. Since then, the formal-methods community has spent much effort
finding restrictions and variations that ensure decidability [8, 31, 35, 50, 64, 66, 69, 74]. The common
thread in these approaches is hierarchical information: players can be totally ordered according
to how well they observe the game. Another line of works establishes that decidability can be
retained by forbidding private communication, i.e., by considering variants around the idea that
all new information should be public [4, 5, 11, 72, 79, 80].
Strategy Logic with imperfect information.We propose an extension of Strategy Logic to the
imperfect-information setting, which we call SLii. The first step is to choose how to introduce
imperfect information in the logic. In the formal-methods literature it is typical to associate obser-
vations to players. In SLii, instead, we associate observations to strategies: the strategy quantifier
〈〈x〉〉 from SL is now parameterised by observation o, written 〈〈x〉〉o . This novelty allows one to
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express, in the logic, that a player’s observation changes over time, to capture for instance the
loss of a sensor resulting in a diminished observation power. We also add to our logic SLii the out-
come quantifier A from Branching-time Strategy Logic (BSL) [45], which quantifies on outcomes
of strategies currently used by the agents, and the unbinding operator (a, ?), which frees an agent
from her current strategy. This does not increase the expressivity of the logic but presents advan-
tages that we discuss in Section 2.2. For instance it allows us to naturally consider nondeterministic
strategies (Strategy Logic only considers deterministic ones), which in turn allows us to capture
module checking, the extension of model checking to open systems [42, 43, 52].
The logic SLii is very powerful: it is an extension of SL (which considers perfect information),
and of the imperfect-information strategic logicsATL∗i,R [15] and ATL
∗
sc,i [55]. As alreadymentioned,
SLii can express the distributed synthesis problem [69]. This problem asks whether there are strate-
gies for components a1, . . . ,an of a distributed system to enforce some property given as an LTL
formula ψ against all behaviours of the environment. This can be expressed by the SLii formula
ΦSynth := 〈〈x1〉〉o1 . . . 〈〈xn〉〉on (a1, x1) . . . (an , xn)Aψ , where oi represents the local view of compo-
nent ai . Also, SLii can express more complicated specifications by alternating quantifiers, binding
the same strategy to different agents and rebinding (these are inherited from SL), as well as chang-
ing observations. For instance, it can express the existence of Nash equilibria.
Main result.Of course, the high expressivity of SLii comes at a cost from a computational complex-
ity point of view. Its satisfiability problem is undecidable (this is already true of SL), and so is its
model-checking problem (this is already true of ATL∗i,R even for the single formula 〈{a,b}〉Fp [25],
which means that agents a and b have a strategy profile to reach a situation where p holds). We
mentioned that the twomain settings in which decidability is retrieved for distributed synthesis are
hierarchical information and public actions. We extend the first approach to the setting of strategic
logics by introducing a syntactic class of “hierarchical instances” of SLii, i.e., formula/model pairs,
and proving that the model-checking problem on this class of instances is decidable. Intuitively, an
instance of SLii is hierarchical if, as one goes down the syntactic tree of the formula, the observa-
tions annotating strategy quantifications can only become finer. Although the class of hierarchical
instances refers not only to the syntax of the logic but also to the model, the class is syntactical in
the sense that it depends only on the structure of the formula and the observations in the model.
Moreover, it is straightforward to check (in linear time) whether an instance is hierarchical or not.
Applications. Because the syntax of SLii allows for arbitrary alternations of quantifiers in the
formulas, our decidability result for hierarchical instances allows one to decide strategic problems
more involved thanmodule checking and distributed synthesis. For instance, we show in Section 7
how one can apply our result to establish that the existence of Nash equilibria is decidable in games
with imperfect information, in the case of hierarchical observations and deterministic strategies.
This problem is relevant as Nash equilibria do not always exist in games with imperfect informa-
tion [30]. We then consider the problem of rational synthesis [23, 30, 33, 48], both in its cooperative
and non-cooperative variants. We introduce the generalisations of these problems to the case of
imperfect information, and call them cooperative and non-cooperative rational distributed synthe-
sis. We then apply again our main result to establish that they are decidable in hierarchical systems
for deterministic strategies. For the non-cooperative variant, we need the additional assumption
that the environment is at least as informed as the system. This is the case for example when one
ignores the actual observation power of the environment, and considers that it plays with perfect
information. Doing so yields systems that are robust to any observation power the environment
may have. As Reif puts it, this amounts to synthesising strategies that are winning even if the
opponent “cheats” and uses information it is not supposed to have access to [73].
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Approach. In order to solve the model-checking problem for SLii we introduce an intermediate
logic QCTL∗ii, an extension to the imperfect-information setting of QCTL
∗ [53], itself an extension
of CTL∗ by second-order quantifiers over atoms. This is a low-level logic that does not mention
strategies and into which one can effectively compile instances of SLii. States of the models of the
logic QCTL∗ii have internal structure, much like the multi-player game structures from [63] and
distributed systems [39]. Model-checking QCTL∗ii is also undecidable (indeed, we show how to
reduce from the MSO-theory of the binary tree extended with the equal-length predicate, known
to be undecidable [56]). We introduce the syntactical class QCTL∗i,⊆ of hierarchical formulas as
those in which innermost quantifiers observe more than outermost quantifiers, and prove that
model-checking is decidable using an extension of the automata-theoretic approach for branching-
time logics. We provide a reduction from model checking SLii to model checking QCTL∗ii that
preserves being hierarchical, thus establishing our main contribution, i.e., that model checking
the hierarchical instances of SLii is decidable.
Complexity. To establish the precise complexity of the problems we solve, we introduce a new
measure on formulas called simulation depth. This measure resembles the notion of alternation
depth (see, e.g., [60]), which counts alternations between existential and universal strategy (or
second-order) quantifications. But instead of merely counting alternations between such oper-
ators, simulation depth reflects the underlying automata operations required to treat formulas,
while remaining a purely syntactical notion. We prove that the model-checking problem for the
hierarchical fragment of QCTL∗ii and SLii are both (k + 1)-Exptime-complete for formulas of sim-
ulation depth at most k . Already for the perfect-information fragment, this result is more precise
than what was previously known. Indeed, precise upper bounds based on alternation depth were
known for syntactic fragments of SL but not for the full logic [60].
Related work. The literature on imperfect information in formal methods and artificial intelli-
gence is very vast. Imperfect information has been considered in two-player games [7, 26, 73],
module checking [43, 52], distributed synthesis of reactive systems [31, 50, 69] and strategies in
multiplayer games [8, 64, 65], Nash equilibria [11, 13, 72], rational synthesis [30, 38], doomsday
equilibria [19], admissible strategies [14], quantitative objectives [24, 62], and more, some of which
we detail below.
Limited alternation of strategy quantification was studied in [17], in which several decidability
results are proved for two and three alternations of existential and universal quantifiers. Except
for one where the first player has perfect information, all the problems solved in this work are
hierarchical instances, and are thus particular cases of our main result.
Quantified µ-Calculus with partial observation is studied in [66], where the model-checking
problem is solved by considering a syntactic constraint based on hierarchical information, as we do
forQCTL∗ii. However they consider asynchronous perfect recall, and the automata techniques they
use to deal with imperfect information cannot be used in the synchronous perfect-recall setting
that we consider in this work. Similarly the narrowing operation on tree automata (see Section 4.1),
which is crucial in our model-checking procedure, considers synchronous perfect recall and does
not seem easy to adapt to the asynchronous setting.
A number of works have considered strategic logics with imperfect information. Various seman-
tics for ATL with imperfect information have been studied in, e.g., [41, 44]. The model-checking
problem for these logics, which is undecidable for agents with perfect recall [25], has been studied
for agents with bounded memory, for which decidability is recovered [58, 75]. An epistemic strate-
gic logic with original operators different from those of ATL and SL is proposed in [40]. It considers
imperfect information strategies, but only for agents without memory. Concerning perfect recall,
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which interest us in this work, decidability results have also been obtained for ATL [37] and ATL
with strategy context [55] when agents have the same information.
In [45], a branching-time variant of SL is extended with epistemic operators and agents with
perfect recall. Strategies are not required to be uniform in the semantics, but this requirement
can be expressed in the language. However no decidability result is provided. Another variant
of SL extended with epistemic operators and imperfect-information, perfect-recall strategies is
presented in [3], but model checking is not studied. The latter logic is extended in [4], in which
its model-checking problem is solved on the class of systems where all agents’ actions are public,
which is an assumption orthogonal to hierarchical information.
The work closest to ours is [32] which introduces a logic CL in which one can encode many
distributed synthesis problems. In this logic, hierarchical information is a necessary consequence
of the syntax and semantics, and as a result its model-checking problem is decidable. However, CL
is close in spirit to ourQCTL∗i,⊆ , and its semantics is less intuitive than that of SLii. Furthermore, by
means of a natural translation we derive that CL is strictly included in the hierarchical instances
of SLii (Section 6.2). In particular, hierarchical instances of SLii can express non-observable goals,
while CL cannot. When considering players that choose their own goals it may be natural to
assume that they can observe the facts that define whether their objectives are satisfied or not.
But when synthesising programs for instance, it may be enough that their behaviours enforce the
desired properties, without them having the knowledge that it is enforced. Such non-observable
winning conditions have been studied in, e.g., [8, 16, 24].
Outline. In Section 2 we define SLii and hierarchical instances, and present some examples. In
Section 3 we define QCTL∗ii and its hierarchical fragment QCTL
∗
i,⊆. The proof that model checking
QCTL∗i,⊆ is decidable, including the required automata preliminaries, is in Section 4. The hierarchy-
preserving translation of SLii into QCTL∗ii is in Section 5. In Section 6 we compare SLii with related
logics, and in Section 7 we apply our main result to obtain decidability results for various strategic
problems under imperfect information. Finally we conclude and discuss future work in Section 8.
2 SLWITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
In this section we introduce SLii, an extension of SL to the imperfect-information setting with
synchronous perfect-recall. Our logic presents several original features compared to SL, which
we discuss in detail in Section 2.3: we introduce an outcome quantifier akin to the path quantifier
in branching-time temporal logics, we allow for nondeterministic strategies and unbinding agents
from their strategies, andwe annotate strategy quantifiers with observation symbols which denote
the information available to strategies. We first fix some basic notations.
2.1 Notations
Let Σ be an alphabet. A finite (resp. infinite) word over Σ is an element of Σ∗ (resp. Σω ). Words are
writtenw = w0w1w2 . . ., i.e., indexing begins with 0. The length of a finite wordw = w0w1 . . .wn is
|w | := n+1, and last(w) := wn is its last letter. Given a finite (resp. infinite) wordw and 0 ≤ i < |w |
(resp. i ∈ N), we let wi be the letter at position i in w , w≤i is the prefix of w that ends at position
i and w≥i is the suffix of w that starts at position i . We write w 4 w ′ if w is a prefix of w ′, and
pref (w) is the set of finite prefixes of wordw . Finally, the domain of a mapping f is written dom(f ),
its codomain codom(f ), and for n ∈ N we let [n] := {i ∈ N : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
2.2 Syntax
For the rest of the paper, for convenience we fix a number of parameters for our logics and models:
AP is a finite non-empty set of atomic propositions, Ag is a finite non-empty set of agents or players,
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andVar is a finite non-empty set of variables. Themain novelty of our logic is that we specifywhich
information is available to a strategy, by annotating strategy quantifiers 〈〈x〉〉 with observation
symbols o from a finite set Obs, that we also fix for the rest of the paper. When we consider model-
checking problems, these data are implicitly part of the input.
Definition 2.1 (SLii Syntax). The syntax of SLii is defined by the following grammar:
φ := p | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | 〈〈x〉〉oφ | (a, x)φ | (a, ?)φ | Eψ
ψ := φ | ¬ψ | ψ ∨ψ | Xψ | ψUψ
where p ∈ AP, x ∈ Var, o ∈ Obs and a ∈ Ag.
Formulas of type φ are called state formulas, those of type ψ are called path formulas, and SLii
consists of all the state formulas defined by the grammar.
Boolean operators and temporal operators, X (read “next”) and U (read “until”), have the usual
meaning. The strategy quantifier 〈〈x〉〉o is a first-order-like quantification on strategies: 〈〈x〉〉oφ
reads as “there exists a strategy x that takes decisions based on observation o such that φ holds”,
where x is a strategy variable. The binding operator (a, x) assigns a strategy to an agent, and (a, x)φ
reads as “when agent a plays strategy x , φ holds”. The unbinding operator (a, ?) instead releases
agent a from her current strategy, if she has one, and (a, ?)φ reads as “when agent a is not assigned
any strategy, φ holds”. Finally, the outcome quantifier E quantifies on outcomes of strategies cur-
rently in use: Eψ reads as “ψ holds in some outcome of the strategies currently used by the players”.
We use abbreviations ⊤ := p ∨ ¬p, ⊥:= ¬⊤, φ → φ ′ := ¬φ ∨ φ ′, φ ↔ φ ′ := φ → φ ′ ∧ φ ′ → φ
for boolean connectives, Fφ := ⊤Uφ (read “eventually φ”), Gφ := ¬F¬φ (read “globally φ”) for
temporal operators, [[x]]oφ := ¬〈〈x〉〉o¬φ (read “for all strategies x based on observation o, φ holds”)
and Aψ := ¬E¬ψ (read “all outcomes of the current strategies satisfy ψ ”).
For every formula φ ∈ SLii, we let free (φ) be the set of variables that appear free in φ, i.e., that
appear out of the scope of a strategy quantifier. A formulaφ is a sentence if free (φ) is empty. Finally,
we let the size |φ | of a formula φ be the number of symbols in φ.
2.3 Discussion on the syntax
We discuss the syntactic differences between our logic and usual Strategy Logic.
Outcomequantifier.This quantifier was introduced in Branching-time Strategy Logic (BSL) [45],
which corresponds to the perfect-information fragment of the logic we define here. It removes a
quirk of previous definitions, in which temporal operators could only be evaluated in contexts
where all agents were assigned a strategy. The outcome quantifier, instead, allows for evaluation
of temporal properties on partial assignments. As a result, the notions of free agents and agent-
complete assignments from previous definitions of Strategy Logic are no longer needed (see, e.g.,
[60]). In addition, the outcome quantifier highlights the inherent branching-time nature of Strategy
Logic: indeed, in SL, branching-time properties can be expressed by resorting to artificial strategy
quantifications for all agents. It will also make the correspondence withQCTL∗ii tighter, which will
allow us to establish the precise complexity of the problem we solve, while the exact complexity
of model checking classic SL with perfect information is still not known. Finally, since the usual
definition of SL requires that the current strategies define a unique outcome on which linear-time
temporal operators are evaluated, only deterministic strategies were considered. The introduction
of the outcome quantifier allows us to consider nondeterministic strategies.
Unbinding.With the possibility to evaluate temporal operators even when some agents are not
bound to any strategy, it becomes interesting to include the unbinding operator (a, ?), introduced
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in [54] for ATL with strategy context and also present in BSL. Note that the outcome quantifier
and unbinding operator do not increase the expressivity of SL, at the level of sentences [45].
Observations. In games with imperfect information and ATL-like logics with imperfect informa-
tion, a strategy is always bound to some player, and thus it is clear with regards to what observa-
tions it should be defined. In SL on the other hand, strategy quantification and binding are separate.
This adds expressive power with regards to ATL by allowing, for instance, to assign the same strat-
egy to two different players, but it also entails that when a quantification is made on a strategy,
one does not know with regards to which observation this strategy should be defined. We know
of three ways to solve this. One is the approach followed here, which consists in associating with
strategy quantifiers an observation power. The second solution is to abandon the separation be-
tween quantification and binding and to use instead quantifiers of the form ∃a , meaning “there
exists a strategy for player a”, like in [2, 21]: with this operator, the strategy is immediately bound
to player a, which indicates with regards to which observation the strategy should be compati-
ble. The third one, adopted in [4], consists in requiring that a strategy be uniform for all agents
to whom it will be bound in the formula. We chose to adopt the first solution for its simplicity
and expressiveness. Indeed the second solution limits expressiveness by disallowing, for instance,
binding the same strategy to different agents. The third solution leads to a logic that is more ex-
pressive than the second one, but less than the first one. Indeed, the logic that we study here can
capture the logic from [4] (assuming that models contain observations corresponding to unions of
individual observations), and in addition SLii can express changes of agents’ observation power.
2.4 Semantics
The models of SLii are classic concurrent game structures extended by an interpretation for obser-
vation symbols in Obs.
Definition 2.2 (CGSii). A concurrent game structure with imperfect information (or CGSii for short)
is a tuple G = (Ac,V , E, ℓ,vι,O) where
• Ac is a finite non-empty set of actions,
• V is a finite non-empty set of positions,
• E : V × AcAg → V is a transition function,
• ℓ : V → 2AP is a labelling function,
• vι ∈ V is an initial position, and
• O : Obs→ 2V×V is an observation interpretation.
For o ∈ Obs, O(o) is an equivalence relation on positions, that we may write ∼o . It represents
what a strategy with observation o can see: O(o)-equivalent positions are indistinguishable to such
a strategy. Also, ℓ(v) is the set of atomic propositions that hold in position v .
We define the size |G| of a CGSii G = (Ac,V , E, ℓ,vι,O) as the size of an explicit encoding of
the transition function: |G| := |V | × |Ac| |Ag | × ⌈log(|V |)⌉. We may write v ∈ G for v ∈ V .
We now introduce a number of notions involved in the semantics of SLii. Consider a CGSii
G = (Ac,V , E, ℓ,vι,O).
Joint actions. In a position v ∈ V , each player a chooses an action ca ∈ Ac, and the game
proceeds to position E(v,c), where c ∈ AcAg stands for the joint action (ca)a∈Ag. Given a joint
action c = (ca)a∈Ag and a ∈ Ag, we let ca denote ca .
Plays. A finite (resp. infinite) play is a finite (resp. infinite) word ρ = v0 . . .vn (resp. π = v0v1 . . .)
such that v0 = vι and for every i such that 0 ≤ i < |ρ | − 1 (resp. i ≥ 0), there exists a joint action c
such that E(vi ,c) = vi+1.
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Strategies.A (nondeterministic) strategy is a function σ : V + → 2Ac \ ∅ that maps each finite play
to a nonempty finite set of actions that the player may play. A strategy σ is deterministic if for all
ρ, σ (ρ) is a singleton. We let Str denote the set of all strategies.
Assignments. An assignment is a partial function χ : Ag ∪ Var ⇀ Str , assigning to each player
and variable in its domain a strategy. For an assignment χ , a player a and a strategy σ , χ[a 7→ σ ] is
the assignment of domain dom(χ)∪{a} that maps a to σ and is equal to χ on the rest of its domain,
and χ[x 7→ σ ] is defined similarly, where x is a variable; also, χ[a 7→ ?] is the restriction of χ to
domain dom(χ) \ {a}. In addition, given a formula φ ∈ SLii, an assignment is variable-complete for
φ if its domain contains all free variables of φ.
Outcomes. For an assignment χ and a finite play ρ, we let Out(χ , ρ) be the set of infinite plays that
start with ρ and are then extended by letting players follow the strategies assigned by χ . Formally,
Out(χ , ρ) is the set of plays of the form ρ · v1v2 . . . such that for all i ≥ 0, there exists c such that
for all a ∈ dom(χ) ∩ Ag, ca ∈ χ(a)(ρ · v1 . . .vi ) and vi+1 = E(vi ,c), with v0 = last(ρ).
Synchronous perfect recall. In this work we consider players with synchronous perfect recall,
meaning that each player remembers the whole history of a play, a classic assumption in games
with imperfect information and logics of knowledge and time. Each observation relation is thus
extended to finite plays as follows: ρ ∼o ρ ′ if |ρ | = |ρ ′ | and ρi ∼o ρ ′i for every i ∈ {0, . . . , |ρ | − 1}.
Imperfect-information strategies. For o ∈ Obs, a strategy σ is an o-strategy if σ (ρ) = σ (ρ ′)
whenever ρ ∼o ρ ′. The latter constraint captures the essence of imperfect information, which is
that players can base their strategic choices only on the information available to them. For o ∈ Obs
we let Stro be the set of all o-strategies.
Definition 2.3 (SLii semantics). The semantics of a state formula is defined on a CGSii G, an
assignment χ that is variable-complete for φ, and a finite play ρ. For a path formula ψ , the finite
play is replaced with an infinite play π and an index i ∈ N. The definition by mutual induction is
as follows:
G, χ , ρ |= p if p ∈ ℓ(last(ρ))
G, χ , ρ |= ¬φ if G, χ , ρ 6 |= φ
G, χ , ρ |= φ ∨ φ ′ if G, χ , ρ |= φ or G, χ , ρ |= φ ′
G, χ , ρ |= 〈〈x〉〉oφ if ∃σ ∈ Stro s.t. G, χ[x 7→ σ ], ρ |= φ
G, χ , ρ |= (a, x)φ if G, χ[a 7→ χ(x)], ρ |= φ
G, χ , ρ |= (a, ?)φ if G, χ[a 7→ ?], ρ |= φ
G, χ , ρ |= Eψ if there exists π ∈ Out(χ , ρ) such that G, χ , π , |ρ | − 1 |= ψ
G, χ , π , i |= φ if G, χ , π≤i |= φ
G, χ , π , i |= ¬ψ if G, χ , π , i 6 |= ψ
G, χ , π , i |= ψ ∨ψ ′ if G, χ , π , i |= ψ or G, χ , π , i |= ψ ′
G, χ , π , i |= Xψ if G, χ , π , i + 1 |= ψ
G, χ , π , i |= ψUψ ′ if ∃ j ≥ i s.t. G, χ , π , j |= ψ ′
and ∀k s.t. i ≤ k < j, G, χ , π ,k |= ψ
Remark 1. Observe that because of the semantics of the outcome quantifier, and unlike usual defi-
nitions of SL, the meaning of an SLii sentence depends on the assignment in which it is evaluated.
For instance the SLii formula AFp is clearly a sentence, but whether G, χ , ρ |= AFp holds or not
depends on which agents are bound to a strategy in χ and what these strategies are. However, as
usual, a sentence does not require an assignment to be evaluated, and for an SLii sentence φ we let
G, ρ |= φ if G, ∅, ρ |= φ for the empty assignment ∅, and we write G |= φ if G,vι |= φ.
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SL is the fragment of SLii obtained by interpreting all observation symbols as the identity re-
lation (which models perfect information), restricting to deterministic strategies, and considering
only assignments in which each agent has a strategy (in this case the outcome of an assignment
consists of a single play; one can thus get rid of the outcome quantifier and evaluate temporal
operators in the unique outcome of the current assignment, as usually done in SL). Also, CTL∗ is
the fragment of SLii which uses no binding, unbinding or strategy quantification.
2.5 Discussion on the semantics
We now discuss some aspects of the semantics.
Evaluation on finite plays. Unlike previous definitions of Strategy Logic, we evaluate formulas
on finite plays (instead of positions), where the finite play represents the whole history starting
from the initial position of the CGSii in which the formula is evaluated. There are several reasons
to do so. First, it allows us to define the semantics more simply without having to resort to the
notion of assignment translations. Second, it makes it easier to see the correctness of the reduction
toQCTL∗ii, that we present in Section 5. In SL, a strategy only has access to the history of the game
starting from the point where the strategy quantifier from which it arises has been evaluated.
In contrast, in SLii strategies have access to the whole history, starting from the initial position.
However this does not affect the semantics, in the sense that the perfect-information fragment of
SLii with deterministic strategies corresponds to SL. Indeed, when agents have perfect information,
having access to the past or not does not affect the existence of strategies to enforce temporal
properties that only concern the future.
Players not remembering their actions. Our definition of synchronous perfect recall only con-
siders the sequence of positions in finite plays, and forgets about actions taken by players. In
particular, it is possible in this definition that a player cannot distinguish between two finite plays
in which she plays different actions. This definition is standard in games with imperfect infor-
mation [7, 8, 26, 80], since remembering one’s actions or not is indifferent for the existence of
distributed winning strategies or Nash equilibria. However it makes a difference for some more
involved solution concepts that are expressible in strategic logics such as SLii. For instance it is
observed in [10, Appendix A] that some games admit subgame-perfect equilibria only if agents
remember their own past actions. Nonetheless we consider the setting where agents do not re-
member their actions, as it is the most general. Indeed, as noted in [18, Remark 2.1, p.8], one can
simulate agents that remember their own actions by storing in positions of the game the infor-
mation of the last joint move played (this may create |Ac| |Ag | copies of each position, but the
branching degree is unchanged). One can then adapt indistinguishability relations to take actions
into account. For instance, for an observation symbol o and an agent a, one could consider a new
observation symbol oa that would be interpreted in the enriched game structure as the refinement
of ∼o that considers two positions indistinguishable if they are indistinguishable for ∼o and con-
tain the same last action for agent a. Binding agent a only to strategies that use observation of the
form oa for some o captures the fact that agent a remembers her actions.
Agents changing observation. In SLii observations are not bound to agents but to strategies.
And because agents can change their strategy thanks to the binding operator, it follows that they
can change observation, or more precisely they can successively play with strategies that have
different observations. For instance consider a controller that observes a system through a set of
n sensors S = {s1, . . . , sn} as in, e.g., [9]. Let oi be the observation power provided by the set
of sensors S \ {si } (one can think of a system where states are tuples of local states, each sensor
observing one component). Also let o be the observation power provided by the full set S of sensors,
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and let atom faulti represent the fact that a fault occurs on sensor si . The formula
φ := 〈〈x〉〉o (a, x)AG
(
safe ∧
n∧
i=1
faulti → 〈〈x〉〉
oi (a, x)AG safei
)
expresses that the controller a has a strategy (which uses all sensors in S) to maintain the system
safe, and if a sensor is lost, it can respond by switching to a strategy using the remaining sensors
to maintain some alternative, possibly weaker, security requirement safei .
2.6 Model checking and hierarchical instances
We now introduce the main decision problem of this paper, which is the model-checking problem
for SLii. An SLii-instance is a model together with a formula, i.e., it is a pair (G,Φ) where G is a
CGSii and Φ ∈ SLii.
Definition 2.4 (Model checking SLii). Themodel-checking problem for SLii is the decision problem
that, given an SLii-instance (G,Φ), returns ‘Yes’ if G |= Φ, and ‘No’ otherwise.
It is well known that deciding the existence of winning strategies in multi-player games with
imperfect information is undecidable for reachability objectives [63]. Since this problem is easily
reduced to the model-checking problem for SLii, we get the following result.
Theorem 2.5. The model-checking problem for SLii is undecidable.
Hierarchical instances.We now isolate a sub-problem obtained by restricting attention to hier-
archical instances. Intuitively, an SLii-instance (G,Φ) is hierarchical if, as one goes down a path in
the syntactic tree of Φ, the observations tied to quantifications become finer.
Definition 2.6 (Hierarchical instances). An SLii-instance (G,Φ) is hierarchical if for every subfor-
mula φ1 = 〈〈y〉〉o1φ ′1 of Φ and subformula φ2 = 〈〈x〉〉
o2φ ′2 of φ
′
1, it holds that O(o2) ⊆ O(o1).
IfO(o2) ⊆ O(o1)we say thato2 is finer thano1 in G, and thato1 is coarser thano2 inG. Intuitively,
this means that a player with observation o2 observes game G no worse than, i.e., knows at least
as much as a player with observation o1.
Remark 2. If one uses the trick described in Section 2.5 to model agents that remember their own
actions, then for an agent a to know at least as much as another agent b it needs to be the case
that, in particular, agent a observes all actions played by agent b.
Example 2.7 (Fault-tolerant diagnosibility). Consider the following formula from Section 2.5:
φ := 〈〈x〉〉o (a, x)AG
(
safe ∧
n∧
i=1
faulti → 〈〈x〉〉
oi (a, x)AG safei
)
As already discussed, it expresses that the controller can react to the loss of a sensor to keep
ensuring some property of the system. Clearly, the controller’s observation oi after the loss of
sensor i is coarser than its original observation o, and thus formula φ in such a system does not
form a hierarchical instance.
We now give an example of scenario where hierarchical instances occur naturally.
Example 2.8 (Security levels). Consider a system with different “security levels”, where higher
levels have access to more data (i.e., can observe more). Assume that the CGSii G is such that
O(on) ⊆ O(on−1) ⊆ . . . ⊆ O(o1): in other words, level n has the highest security clearance, while
level 1 has the lowest. Consider that agent a wants to reach some objective marked by atom “goal”,
that it starts with the lowest observation clearance o1, and that atomic formula “promotei ” means
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that the agent is granted access to level i (observe that whenever we have promotei , we should
also have promotej for all j < i). For every i we let
φi (φ
′) := goal ∨ (promotei ∧ 〈〈x〉〉
oi (a, x)AFφ ′)
Now the formula
φ := φ1(φ2(. . .φn−1(φn(goal)) . . .))
means that agent a can enforce her goal, possibly by first getting access to higher security levels
and using this additional observation power to reach the goal. Because the strategy quantifications
that are deeper in the formula have access to more information, this formula forms a hierarchical
instance in G.
Here is the main contribution of this work:
Theorem 2.9. The model-checking problem for SLii restricted to the class of hierarchical instances
is decidable.
We prove this result in Section 5 by reducing it to the model-checking problem for the hierar-
chical fragment of a logic calledQCTL∗ with imperfect information, which we now introduce and
study in order to use it as an intermediate, “low-level” logic between tree automata and SLii. We
then discuss some applications of this theorem in Section 7.
3 QCTL∗ WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
In this section we introduce an imperfect-information extension of QCTL∗ [34, 46, 47, 53, 77],
which is an extension of CTL∗ with second-order quantification on atomic propositions. In order
to introduce imperfect information, instead of considering equivalence relations between states as
in concurrent game structures, wewill enrich Kripke structures by giving internal structure to their
states, i.e., we see states as n-tuples of local states. This way of modelling imperfect information is
inspired from Reif’s multi-player game structures [63] and distributed systems [39], and we find
it very suitable to application of automata techniques, as discussed in Section 3.3.
The syntax of QCTL∗ii is similar to that of QCTL
∗, except that we annotate second-order quan-
tifiers by subsets o ⊆ [n]. The idea is that quantifiers annotated by o can only “observe” the local
states indexed by i ∈ o. We define the tree-semantics of QCTL∗ii: this means that we interpret for-
mulas on trees that are the unfoldings of Kripke structures (this will capture the fact that players
in SLii have synchronous perfect recall). We then define the syntactic class of hierarchical formulas
and prove, using an automata-theoretic approach, that model checking this class of formulas is
decidable.
For the rest of the section we fix some natural number n ∈ N which parameterises the logic
QCTL∗ii, and which is the number of components in states of the models.
3.1 QCTL∗ii Syntax
The syntax of QCTL∗ii is very similar to that of QCTL
∗: the only difference is that we annotate
quantifiers by a set of indices that defines the “observation” of that quantifier.
Concrete observations. A set o ⊆ [n] is called a concrete observation (to distinguish it from
observations o in the definitions of SLii).
Definition 3.1 (QCTL∗ii Syntax). The syntax of QCTL
∗
ii is defined by the following grammar:
φ := p | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | Eψ | ∃op.φ
ψ := φ | ¬ψ | ψ ∨ψ | Xψ | ψUψ
where p ∈ AP and o ⊆ [n].
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Formulas of typeφ are called state formulas, those of typeψ are called path formulas, andQCTL∗ii
consists of all the state formulas defined by the grammar. We use standard abbreviation Aψ :=
¬E¬ψ . We also use ∃p.φ as a shorthand for ∃[n]p.φ, and we let ∀p.φ := ¬∃p.¬φ.
Given a QCTL∗ii formula φ, we define the set of quantified propositions AP∃(φ) ⊆ AP as the set
of atomic propositions p such that φ has a subformula of the form ∃op.φ. We also define the set of
free propositions APf (φ) ⊆ AP as the set of atomic propositions that have an occurrence which is
not under the scope of any quantifier of the form ∃op. Observe that AP∃(φ) ∩APf (φ)may not be
empty, i.e., a proposition may appear both free and quantified in (different places of) a formula.
3.2 QCTL∗ii semantics
Several semantics have been considered for QCTL∗, the two most studied being the structure se-
mantics and the tree semantics (see [53] for more details). For the semantics of QCTL∗ii we adapt
the tree semantics, and we explain the reasons for doing so in Section 3.3.
As already mentioned, for QCTL∗ii we consider structures whose states are tuples of local states.
We now define these structures and related notions.
Definition 3.2 (Compound Kripke structures). A compound Kripke structure, or CKS, over AP is a
tuple S = (S,R, ℓ, sι) where
• S ⊆
∏
i ∈[n] Li is a set of states, with {Li }i ∈[n] a family of n disjoint finite sets of local states,
• R ⊆ S × S is a left-total1 transition relation,
• ℓ : S → 2AP is a labelling function and
• sι ∈ S is an initial state.
A path in S is an infinite sequence of states λ = s0s1 . . . such that for all i ∈ N, (si , si+1) ∈ R. A
finite path is a finite non-empty prefix of a path. We may write s ∈ S for s ∈ S , and we define the
size |S| of a CKS S = (S,R, sι , ℓ) as its number of states: |S| := |S |.
Since we will interpret QCTL∗ii on unfoldings of CKS, we now define infinite trees.
Trees. In many works, trees are defined as prefix-closed sets of words with the empty word ϵ as
root. Here trees represent unfoldings of Kripke structures, and we find it more convenient to see
a node u as a sequence of states and the root as the initial state. Let X be a finite set of directions
(typically a set of states). An X -tree τ is a nonempty set of words τ ⊆ X+ such that:
• there exists r ∈ X , called the root of τ , such that each u ∈ τ starts with r (r 4 u);
• if u · x ∈ τ and u · x , r , then u ∈ τ ,
• if u ∈ τ then there exists x ∈ X such that u · x ∈ τ .
The elements of a tree τ are called nodes. If u · x ∈ τ , we say that u · x is a child of u. The depth
of a node u is |u |. An X -tree τ is complete if for every u ∈ τ and x ∈ X , u · x ∈ τ . A path in τ is an
infinite sequence of nodes λ = u0u1 . . . such that for all i ∈ N, ui+1 is a child of ui , and Paths(u) is
the set of paths that start in node u.
Labellings. An AP-labelled X -tree, or (AP,X )-tree for short, is a pair t = (τ , ℓ), where τ is an
X -tree called the domain of t and ℓ : τ → 2AP is a labelling, which maps each node to the set of
propositions that hold there. For p ∈ AP, a p-labelling for a tree is a mapping ℓp : τ → {0, 1}
that indicates in which nodes p holds, and for a labelled tree t = (τ , ℓ), the p-labelling of t is the
p-labelling u 7→ 1 if p ∈ ℓ(u), 0 otherwise. The composition of a labelled tree t = (τ , ℓ) with a p-
labelling ℓp for τ is defined as t ⊗ ℓp := (τ , ℓ′), where ℓ′(u) = ℓ(u) ∪ {p} if ℓp (u) = 1, and ℓ(u) \ {p}
otherwise. A p-labelling for a labelled tree t = (τ , ℓ) is a p-labelling for its domain τ . A pointed
labelled tree is a pair (t ,u) where u is a node of t .
1i.e., for all s ∈ S , there exists s ′ such that (s, s ′) ∈ R .
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Ifu = w ·x , the subtree tu of t = (τ , ℓ) is defined as tu := (τu , ℓu)with τu = {x ·w ′ | w ·x ·w ′ ∈ τ },
and ℓu (x ·w ′) = ℓ(w · x ·w ′). A labelled tree is regular if it has finitely many disctinct subtrees.
In the tree semantics ofQCTL∗ii that we consider here, formulas are evaluated on tree unfoldings
of CKS, which we now define.
Tree unfoldings. LetS = (S,R, ℓ, sι) be a compound Kripke structure over AP. The tree-unfolding
of S is the (AP, S)-tree tS := (τ , ℓ
′), where τ is the set of all finite paths that start in sι , and for
every u ∈ τ , ℓ′(u) := ℓ(last(u)).
Note that a labelled tree is regular if and only if it is the unfolding of some finite Kripke structure.
Narrowing. Let X and Y be two finite sets, and let (x ,y) ∈ X × Y . The X -narrowing of (x ,y) is
(x ,y)↓X := x . This definition extends naturally to words and trees over X × Y (point-wise).
Given a family of (disjoint) sets of local states {Li }i ∈[n] and a subset I ⊆ [n], we let LI :=
∏
i ∈I Li
if I , ∅ and L∅ := {0}, where 0 is a special symbol. For I , J ⊆ [n] and z ∈ LI , we also define
z↓J := z↓LI∩J , where z is seen as a pair z = (x ,y) ∈ LI∩J × LI\J , i.e., we apply the above definition
with X = LI∩J and Y = LI\J . This is well defined because having taken sets Li to be disjoint, the
ordering of local states in z is indifferent. We also extend this definition to words and trees. In
particular, for every LI -tree τ , τ ↓∅ is the only L∅-tree, 0ω .
Quantification and uniformity. In QCTL∗ii ∃
op.φ holds in a tree t if there is some o-uniform
p-labelling of t such that t with this p-labelling satisfies φ. Intuitively, a p-labelling of a tree is
o-uniform if every two nodes that are indistinguishable for observation o agree on p.
Definition 3.3 (o-indistinguishability and o-uniformity in p). Fix o ⊆ [n] and I ⊆ [n].
• Two tuples x , x ′ ∈ LI are o-indistinguishable, written x ≈o x ′, if x ↓o= x ′↓o.
• Two words u = u0 . . .ui and u ′ = u ′0 . . .u
′
j over alphabet LI are o-indistinguishable, written
u ≈o u
′, if i = j and for all k ∈ {0, . . . , i} we have uk ≈o u ′k .
• A p-labelling for a tree τ is o-uniform if for all u,u ′ ∈ τ , u ≈o u ′ implies ℓp (u) = ℓp (u ′).
Definition 3.4 (QCTL∗ii semantics). We define by induction the satisfaction relation |= of QCTL
∗
ii.
Let t = (τ , ℓ) be an AP-labelled LI -tree, u a node and λ a path in τ :
t ,u |=p if p ∈ ℓ(u)
t ,u |=¬φ if t ,u 6 |= φ
t ,u |=φ ∨ φ ′ if t ,u |= φ or t ,u |= φ ′
t ,u |= Eψ if ∃ λ ∈ Paths(u) s.t. t , λ |= ψ
t ,u |=∃op.φ if ∃ ℓp a o-uniform p-labelling for t such that t ⊗ ℓp ,u |= φ
t , λ |=φ if t , λ0 |= φ
t , λ |=¬ψ if t , λ 6 |= ψ
t , λ |=ψ ∨ψ ′ if t , λ |= ψ or t , λ |= ψ ′
t , λ |=Xψ if t , λ≥1 |= ψ
t , λ |=ψUψ ′ if ∃ i ≥ 0 s.t. t , λ≥i |= ψ
′ and ∀j s.t. 0 ≤ j < i, t , λ≥j |= ψ
We write t |= φ for t , r |= φ, where r is the root of t . Given a CKS S and a QCTL∗ii formula φ, we
also write S |= φ if S, sι |= φ.
Example 3.5. Consider the following CTL formula:
border(p) := AFp ∧ AG(p → AXAG¬p).
This formula holds in a labelled tree if and only if each path contains exactly one node labelled
with p. Now, consider the following QCTL∗ii formula:
level(p) := ∃∅p. border(p).
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For a blind quantifier, two nodes of a tree are indistinguishable if and only if they have same
depth. Therefore, this formula holds on a tree iff the p’s label all and only the nodes at some fixed
depth. This formula can thus be used to capture the equal level predicate on trees. Actually, just as
QCTL∗ capturesMSO, one can prove that QCTL∗ii with tree semantics subsumes MSO with equal
level [27, 56, 78]. In Theorem3.7wemake use of a similar observation to prove thatmodel-checking
QCTL∗ii is undecidable.
3.3 Discussion on the definition of QCTL∗ii
We now motivate in detail some aspects of QCTL∗ii.
Modelling of imperfect information.Wemodel imperfect information by means of local states
(rather than equivalence relations) because this greatly facilitates the use of automata techniques.
More precisely, in our decision procedure of Section 4 we use an operation on tree automata called
narrowing, which was introduced in [49] to deal with imperfect-information in the context of
distributed synthesis for temporal specifications. Given an automatonA that works onX×Y -trees,
where X and Y are two finite sets, and assuming that we want to model an operation performed
on trees while observing only theX component of each node, this narrowing operation allows one
to build from A an automaton A′ that works on X -trees, such that A′ accepts an X -tree if and
only ifA accepts its widening to X ×Y (intuitively, this widening is the X ×Y -tree in which each
node is labelled as its projection on the original X -tree; see Section 4 for details).
With our definition of compound Kripke structures, their unfoldings are trees over the Carte-
sian product L[n]. To model a quantification ∃
op with observation o ⊆ [n], we can thus use the
narrowing operation to forget about components Li , for i ∈ [n] \o. We then use the classic projec-
tion of nondeterministic tree automata to perform existential quantification on atomic proposition
p. Since the choice of the p-labelling is made directly on Lo-trees, it is necessarily o-uniform.
Choice of the tree semantics. The two most studied semantics for QCTL∗ are the structure
semantics, in which formulas are evaluated directly on Kripke structures, and the tree semantics, in
which Kripke structures are first unfolded into infinite trees. Tree semantics thus allows quantifiers
to choose the value of a quantified atomic proposition in each finite path of the model, while in
structure semantics the choice is onlymade in each state. WhenQCTL∗ is used to express existence
of strategies, existential quantification on atomic propositions labels the structure with strategic
choices; in this kind of application, structure semantics reflects so-called positional or memoryless
strategies, while tree semantics captures perfect-recall or memoryful strategies. Since in this work
we are interested in perfect-recall strategies, we only consider the tree semantics.
3.4 Model checking QCTL∗ii
We now define the model-checking problem studied in the rest of this section.
Definition 3.6 (Model checking QCTL∗ii). Themodel-checking problem forQCTL
∗
ii is the following
decision problem: given an instance (S,Φ) where S is a CKS, and Φ is a QCTL∗ii formula, return
‘Yes’ if S |= Φ and ‘No’ otherwise.
We now prove that the model-checking problem for QCTL∗ii is undecidable. This comes as no
surprise since, as we will show in Section 5, QCTL∗ii can express the existence of distributed win-
ning strategies in imperfect-information games. However we propose a proof that shows the con-
nection between QCTL∗ii and MSO with equal-level predicate [27, 56, 78]. This proof also has the
benefit of showing thatQCTL∗ii is undecidable already for formulas that involve only propositional
quantifiers that observe either everything or nothing.
Theorem 3.7. The model-checking problem for QCTL∗ii is undecidable.
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Proof. LetMSOeq denote the extension of the logicMSO (without unary predicates) by a binary
predicate symbol eq.MSOeq is interpreted on the full binary tree, and the semantics of eq(x ,y) is
that x and y have the same depth in the tree. We show how to effectively translate MSOeq into
QCTL∗ii, and our result follows since theMSOeq-theory of the binary tree is undecidable [56]. The
translation from MSOeq to QCTL∗ii is obtained by extending that from MSO to QCTL [53], using
the formula level(·) from Example 3.5 to help capture the equal-length predicate.
We define a translation̂ from MSOeq to QCTL∗ii such that for every tree t with root r , nodes
u1, . . . ,ui ∈ t and sets of nodesU1, . . . ,Uj ⊆ t , and everyMSOeq formulaφ(x , x1, . . . , xi ,X1, . . . ,X j ),
we have that
t , r ,u1, . . . ,ui ,U1, . . . ,Uj |= φ(x , x1, . . . , xi ,X1, . . . ,X j ) if and only if t̂ , r |= φ̂ (1)
where t̂ is obtained from t by defining the labelling for fresh atomic propositions pxk and pXk , with
k ∈ [i], as follows: pxk ∈ ℓ̂(u) if u = uk and pXk ∈ ℓ̂(u) if u ∈ Uk .
The translation of MSO to QCTL∗ from [53] can be extended to one from MSOeq to QCTL
∗
ii
by adding rules for the equal level predicate. Indeed, for φ(x , x1, . . . , xi ,X1, . . . ,X j ) ∈ MSOeq, we
inductively define the QCTL∗ii formula φ̂ as follows, where k ∈ [i]:x = xk := pxk xk = xl := EF(pxk ∧ pxl )x ∈ Xk := pXk xk ∈ Xl := EF(pxk ∧ pXl )
¬̂φ ′ := ¬φ̂ ′ φ1 ∨ φ2 := φ̂1 ∨ φ̂2∃xk .φ ′ := ∃pxk . uniq(pxk ) ∧ φ̂ ′∃Xk .φ ′ := ∃pXk . φ̂ ′S(x , xk ) := EXpxk S(xk , x) := ⊥S(xk , xl ) := EF(pxk ∧ EXpxl )
where uniq(p) := EFp ∧ ∀q. (EF(p ∧ q) → AG(p → q)) holds in a tree iff it has exactly one node
labelled with p. To understand the x = xk and x ∈ Xk cases, consider that x will be interpreted as
the root. For the S(xk , x) case, observe that x has no incoming edge since it is interpreted as the root.
Second-order quantification ∃Xk is translated into quantification on atomic proposition pXk , and
first-order quantification ∃xk is treated similarly, with the additional constraint that quantification
is limited to pxk -labellings that set pxk to true in one and only one node of the tree.
The rules for eq are as follows:eq(x , xk ) := pxkeq(xk , xl ) := ∃∅p. border(p) ∧ AG(pxk → p ∧ pxl → p)
To understand the first case, observe that since x is interpreted as the root, xk is on the same
level as x if and only if it is also assigned the root. For the second case, recall from Example 3.5
that the QCTL∗ii formula ∃
∅p. border(p) places one unique horizontal line of p’s in the tree, and
thus requiring that xk and xl be both on this line ensures that they are on the same level. The
correctness of the translation follows from (1), which is proven by induction.
Now take an instance (t ,φ(x)) of themodel-checking problem forMSOeq on the full binary tree t .
Let S be a CKS with two states s0 and s1 (local states are irrelevant here), whose transition relation
is the complete relation, and with empty labelling function. Clearly, tS = t , and applying (1) we
get:
t , s0 |= φ(x) iff t̂ , s0 |= φ̂.
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Observe that in the previous line, because there are no free variables besides x , which stands
for the root, we have that t̂ = t = tS , hence we have indeed produced an instance of the model-
checking problem for QCTL∗ii. 
4 A DECIDABLE FRAGMENT OF QCTL∗ii: HIERARCHY ON OBSERVATIONS
The main result of this section is the identification of an important decidable fragment of QCTL∗ii.
Definition 4.1 (Hierarchical formulas). A QCTL∗ii formula φ is hierarchical if for all subformulas
φ1 = ∃
o1p1.φ
′
1 and φ2 = ∃
o2p2.φ
′
2 of φ where φ2 is a subformula of φ
′
1, we have o1 ⊆ o2.
In other words, a formula is hierarchical if innermore propositional quantifiers observe at least
as much as outermore ones.
Example 4.2. Formula ∃{1,2}p. ∃{1,2,4}q.AG(p ∨ q) is hierarchical because {1, 2} ⊆ {1, 2, 4}. On
the other hand, formula ∃{1,2}p.
(
∃
{1,2,4}q.AG(p ∨q) ∧ ∃{3}q′. EF(p ∧q′)
)
is not, because {1, 2} *
{3}. Note that neither is it the case that {3} ⊆ {1, 2}: the observation power of quantifiers ∃{1,2}p.
and ∃{3}q′. are incomparable. Finally, formula ∀{1,2,3}p. ∃{1,2}q. .AG(p∨q) is not hierarchical even
though {1, 2} ⊆ {1, 2, 3}, as the quantifier that observes best is higher in the syntactic tree.
We let QCTL∗i,⊆ be the set of hierarchical QCTL
∗
ii formulas.
Theorem 4.3. Model checking QCTL∗i,⊆ is non-elementary decidable.
Since our decision procedure for the hierarchical fragment of QCTL∗ii is based on an automata-
theoretic approach, we recall some definitions and results for alternating tree automata.
4.1 Alternating parity tree automata
We recall alternating parity tree automata. Because their semantics is defined via acceptance games,
we start with basic definitions for two-player turn-based parity games, or simply parity games.
Parity games.A parity game is a structure G = (V , E,vι,C), whereV = VE⊎VA is a set of positions
partitioned between positions of Eve (VE ) and those of Adam (VA), E ⊆ V ×V is a set of moves, vι
is an initial position and C : V → N is a colouring function of finite codomain. In positions VE ,
Eve chooses the next position, while Adam chooses in positions VA. A play is an infinite sequence
of positions v0v1v2 . . . such that v0 = vι and for all i ≥ 0, (vi ,vi+1) ∈ E (written vi → vi+1). We
assume that for every v ∈ V there exists v ′ ∈ V such that v → v ′. A strategy for Eve is a partial
function V ∗ ⇀ V that maps each finite prefix of a play ending in a position v ∈ VE to a next
position v ′ such that v → v ′. A play v0v1v2 . . . follows a strategy σ of Eve if for every i ≥ 0 such
that vi ∈ VE , vi+1 = σ (v0 . . .vi ). A strategy σ is winning if every play that follows it satisfies the
parity condition, i.e., the least colour seen infinitely often along the play is even.
Parity tree automata. Because it is sufficient for our needs and simplifies definitions, we assume
that all input trees are complete trees. For a set Z , B+(Z ) is the set of formulas built from the
elements of Z as atomic propositions using the connectives ∨ and ∧, and with ⊤,⊥∈ B+(Z ). An
alternating tree automaton (ATA) on (AP,X )-trees is a structure A = (Q, δ ,qι ,C) where Q is a
finite set of states, qι ∈ Q is an initial state, δ : Q × 2AP → B+(X × Q) is a transition function,
and C : Q → N is a colouring function. To ease reading we shall write atoms in B+(X × Q)
between brackets, such as [x ,q]. A nondeterministic tree automaton (NTA) on (AP,X )-trees is an
ATA A = (Q, δ ,qι ,C) such that for every q ∈ Q and a ∈ 2AP, δ (q,a) is written in disjunctive
normal form and for every direction x ∈ X each disjunct contains exactly one element of {x} ×Q .
An NTA is deterministic if for each q ∈ Q and a ∈ 2AP, δ (q,a) consists of a single disjunct.
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Acceptance of a pointed labelled tree (t ,uι), where t = (τ , ℓ), by an ATA A = (Q, δ ,qι ,C) is
defined via the parity gameG(A, t ,uι ) = (V , E,vι,C ′)whereV = τ×Q×B+(X×Q), position (u,q,α)
belongs to Eve if α is of the form α1 ∨ α2 or [x ,q′], and to Adam otherwise, vι = (uι ,qι , δ (qι ,uι)),
and C ′(u,q,α) = C(q). Moves in G(A, t ,uι ) are defined by the following rules:
(u,q,α1 † α2) → (u,q,αi ) where † ∈ {∨,∧} and i ∈ {1, 2},
(u,q, [x ,q′]) → (u · x ,q′, δ (q′, ℓ(u · x)))
Positions of the form (u,q,⊤) and (u,q,⊥) are sinks, winning for Eve and Adam respectively.
A pointed labelled tree (t ,u) is accepted by A if Eve has a winning strategy in G(A, t ,u), and
the language of A is the set of pointed labelled trees accepted by A, written L(A). We write
t ∈ L(A) if (t , r ) ∈ L(A), where r is the root of t . Finally, the size |A| of an ATAA is its number
of states plus the sum of the sizes of all formulas appearing in the transition function.
Word automata. When the set of directions X is a singleton, directions can be forgotten and
infinite trees can be identified with infinite words. We thus call parity word automaton a parity
tree automaton on (AP,X )-trees where X is a singleton. In the case of a nondeterministic parity
word automaton, transitions can be represented as usual as a mapping ∆ : Q × 2AP → 2Q which,
in a state q ∈ Q , reading the label a ∈ 2AP of the current position in the word, indicates a set of
states ∆(q,a) from which Eve can choose to send in the next position of the word.
We recall four classic operations on tree automata.
Complementation. Given an ATA A = (Q, δ ,qι ,C), we define its dual A = (Q, δ ,qι ,C) where,
for each q ∈ Q and a ∈ 2AP, δ (q,a) is the dual of δ (q,a), i.e., conjunctions become disjunctions and
vice versa, and C(q) := C(q) + 1.
Theorem 4.4 (Complementation [61]). For every labelled tree t and node u in t ,
(t ,u) ∈ L(A) if, and only if, (t ,u) < L(A).
Projection. The second construction is a projection operation, used by Rabin to deal with second-
order monadic quantification:
Theorem 4.5 (Projection [71]). Given an NTA N on (AP,X )-trees and an atomic proposition
p ∈ AP, one can build in linear time an NTA N ⇓p on (AP \ {p},X )-trees such that
(t ,u) ∈ L(N ⇓p ) iff there exists a p-labelling ℓp for t s.t. (t ⊗ ℓp ,u) ∈ L(N).
Intuitively,N ⇓p is automatonN with the only difference that when it reads the label of a node,
it can choose to run as if p was either true or false: if δ is the transition function ofN , that ofN ⇓p
is δ ′(q,a) = δ (q,a ∪ {p}) ∨ δ (q,a \ {p}), for any state q and label a ∈ 2AP. Another way of seeing
it is that N ⇓p guesses a p-labelling for the input tree, and simulates N on this modified input.
Simulation. To prevent N ⇓p from guessing different labels for a same node in different execu-
tions, it is crucial that N be nondeterministic, which is the reason why we need the following
result:
Theorem 4.6 (Simulation [61]). Given an ATAA, one can build in exponential time an NTAN
such that L(N) = L(A).
The last construction was introduced by Kupferman and Vardi to deal with imperfect informa-
tion aspects in distributed synthesis. To describe it we need to define a widening operation on
trees which expands the directions in a tree.
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Treewidening.We generalise the widening operation defined in [49]. In the following definitions
we fix a CKS S = (S,R, sι , ℓ), and for I ⊆ [n] we let SI := {s ↓I | s ∈ S} ⊆ LI (recall that
LI =
∏
i ∈I Li ). Let J ⊆ I ⊆ [n]. For every S J -tree τ rooted in s J and sI ∈ SI such that sI ↓J= s J , we
define the I -widening of τ as the SI -tree
τ ↑IsI := {u ∈ sI · S
∗
I | u↓J ∈ τ }.
For an (AP, S J )-tree t = (τ , ℓ) rooted in s J and sI ∈ SI such that sI ↓J= s J , we let
t ↑IsI := (τ ↑
I
sI
, ℓ
′), where ℓ′(u) := ℓ(u↓J ).
When clear from the context we may omit the subscript sI . It is the case in particular when
referring to pointed widenings of trees: (t ↑I ,u) stands for (t ↑Iu0 ,u).
Narrowing.We now state a result from [49] in our slightly more general setting (the proof can be
adapted straightforwardly). The rough idea of this narrowing operation on ATA is that, if one just
observes S J , uniform p-labellings on SI -trees can be obtained by choosing the labellings directly
on S J -trees, and then lifting them to SI .
Theorem 4.7 (Narrowing [49]). Given an ATA A on SI -trees one can build in linear time an
ATA A↓J on S J -trees such that for every pointed (AP, S J )-tree (t ,u) and every u ′ ∈ S+I such that
u ′↓J= u,
(t ,u) ∈ L(A↓J ) iff (t ↑
I
,u ′) ∈ L(A).
4.2 Translating QCTL∗i,⊆ to ATA
In order to prove Theorem 4.3 we need some more notations and a technical lemma that contains
the automata construction.
Definition 4.8. For every φ ∈ QCTL∗ii, we let
Iφ :=
⋂
o∈Obs(φ)
o ⊆ [n],
where Obs(φ) is the set of concrete observations that occur in φ, with the intersection over the
empty set defined as [n]. For a CKS S with state set S ⊆
∏
i ∈[n] Li we also let Sφ := {s ↓Iφ | s ∈ S}.
Elements of Sφ will be the possible directions used by the automaton we build for φ. In other
words, the automaton for φ will work on Sφ -trees. The intuition is that the observations in φ
determine which components of the model’s states can be observed by the automaton.
Our construction, that transforms aQCTL∗i,⊆ formulaφ and aCKSS into anATA, builds upon the
classic construction from [51], which builds ATA forCTL∗ formulas. In addition, we use projection
of automata to treat second-order quantification, and to deal with imperfect information we resort
to automata narrowing.
Moreover, we use tree automata in an original way that allows us to deal with non-observable
atomic propositions, which in turn makes it possible to consider non-observable winning condi-
tions in our decidable fragment of SLii. The classical approach to model checking via tree automata
is to build an automaton that accepts all tree models of the input formula, and check whether it
accepts the unfolding of the model [51]. We instead encode the model in the automata, using the
input tree only to guess labellings for quantified propositions.
Encoding themodel in the automaton.Quantification on atomic propositions is classically per-
formed by means of automata projection (see Theorem 4.5). But in order to obtain a labelling that
is uniform with regards to the observation of the quantifier, we need to make use of the narrowing
operation (see Theorem 4.7). Intuitively, to check that a formula ∃op.φ holds in a tree t , we would
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like to work on its narrowing t ′ := t ↓o, guess a labelling for p on this tree thanks to automata
projection, thus obtaining a tree t ′p , take its widening t
′′
p := t
′
p ↑
[n] , obtaining a tree with an o-
uniform labelling for p, and then check that φ holds on t ′′p . The problem is that unless t = (τ , ℓ) is
o-uniform in every atomic proposition in AP, there is no way to define the labelling of τ ↓o without
losing information. This implies that, unless we restrict to models where all atomic propositions
are observable for all observations o, we cannot pass the model as input to our automata, which
will work on narrowings of trees.
Therefore, to model check a QCTL∗ii formula φ on a CKS S, each state of the automaton that
we build for φ will contain a state of S. The automaton can thus guess paths in S, and evaluate
free occurrences of atomic propositions in S without reading the input tree. The input tree no
longer represents the model, but we use it to carry labellings for quantified atomic propositions in
AP∃(φ): we provide the automaton with an input tree whose labelling is initially empty, and the
automaton, through successive narrowing and projection operations, decorates it with uniform
labellings for quantified atomic propositions.
We remark that this technique allows one to go beyond Coordination Logic [32]: by separating
between quantified atomic propositions (that need to be uniform and are carried by the input tree)
and free atomic propositions (that state facts about the model and are coded in the automaton),
we manage to remove the restriction present in CL, that requires all facts about the model to be
known to every strategy (see Proposition 6.3 in Section 6.2). To do this we assume without loss of
generality that propositions that are quantified in φ do not appear free in φ, i.e., AP∃(φ)∩APf (φ) =
∅.
Finally, given a formula φ, a CKS S and a state s ∈ S, the truth value of φ in (S, s) does not
depend on the labelling of S for atoms in AP∃(φ), which can thus be forgotten. Thus, from now
on we will assume that an instance (S,Φ) of the model-checking problem for QCTL∗ii is such that
AP∃(Φ) ∩ APf (Φ) = ∅ and S is a CKS over APf (Φ).
Merging the decorated input tree and the model. To state the correctness of our construction,
we will need to merge the labels for quantified propositions, carried by the input tree, with those
for free propositions, carried by CKS S. Because, through successive widenings, the input tree
(represented by t in the definition below)will necessarily be a complete tree, its domainwill always
contain the domain of the unfolding of S (represented by t ′ below), hence the following definition.
Definition 4.9 (Merge). Let t = (τ , ℓ) be a complete (AP,X )-tree and t ′ = (τ ′, ℓ′) an (AP ′,X )-tree
with same root as t , where AP∩AP ′ = ∅. We define themerge of t and t ′ as the (AP∪AP ′,X )-tree
t ! t ′ := (τ ∩ τ ′ = τ ′, ℓ′′),
where ℓ′′(u) = ℓ(u) ∪ ℓ′(u).
We now describe our automata construction. Let (S,Φ) be an instance of the model-checking
problem for QCTL∗i,⊆, where S = (S,R, ℓS, sι).
Lemma 4.10 (Translation). For every subformula φ of Φ and state s of S, one can build an ATA
A
φ
s on (AP∃(Φ), Sφ )-trees such that for every (AP∃(Φ), Sφ )-tree t rooted in sι ↓Iφ , every u ∈ tS ending
in s , it holds that
(t ,u↓Iφ ) ∈ L(A
φ
s ) iff t ↑
[n]
! tS,u |= φ.
Proof. Let AP∃ = AP∃(Φ) and APf = APf (Φ), and recall that S is labelled over APf . For each
state s ∈ S and each subformula φ of Φ (note that all subformulas of Φ are also hierarchical), we
define by induction on φ the ATAA
φ
s on (AP∃, Sφ )-trees.
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φ = p : First, by Definition 4.8, Sφ = S[n] = S . We letA
p
s be the ATA over S-trees with one unique
state qι , with transition function defined as follows:
δ (qι ,a) =

⊤ if
p ∈ APf and p ∈ ℓS(s)
or
p ∈ AP∃ and p ∈ a
⊥ if
p ∈ APf and p < ℓS(s)
or
p ∈ AP∃ and p < a
φ = ¬φ ′ :We let Aφs := A
φ′
s .
φ = φ1 ∨ φ2 : Because Iφ = Iφ1 ∩ Iφ2 , and each A
φi
s for i ∈ {1, 2} works on Lφi -trees, we first
narrow them so that they work on Lφ -trees: for i ∈ {1, 2}, we let Ai := A
φi
s ↓Iφ = (Q
i , δ i ,qiι ,C
i ).
Letting qι be a fresh initial state we define A
φ
s := ({qι} ∪ Q
1 ∪ Q2, δ ,qι ,C), where δ and C agree
with δ i andCi , respectively, on states fromQi , and δ (qι ,a) = δ 1(q1ι ,a) ∨ δ
2(q2ι ,a). The colour of qι
does not matter.
φ = Eψ : Let max(ψ ) = {φ1, . . . ,φk } be the set of maximal state subformulas of ψ . In a first
step we see these maximal state subformulas as atomic propositions, we see ψ as an LTL formula
over max(ψ ), and we build a nondeterministic parity word automaton Wψ = (Qψ ,∆ψ ,qψι ,C
ψ )
over alphabet 2max(ψ ) that accepts exactly the models of ψ (and uses two colours) [81]. We define
the ATA A that, given as input a (max(ψ ), Sφ )-tree t , nondeterministically guesses a path λ in
t ↑[n] ! tS , or equivalently a path in S starting from s , and simulatesW
ψ on it, assuming that the
labels it reads while following λ ↓Iφ in its input t correctly represent the truth value of formulas
in max(ψ ) along λ. Recall that S = (S,R, sι , ℓS); we define A := (Q, δ ,qι ,C), where
• Q = Qψ × S ,
• qι = (q
ψ
ι , s),
• for each (qψ , s ′) ∈ Q , C(qψ , s ′) = Cψ (qψ ), and
• for each (qψ , s ′) ∈ Q and a ∈ 2max(ψ ),
δ ((qψ , s ′),a) =
∨
q′∈∆ψ (qψ ,a)
∨
s ′′∈R(s ′)
[s ′′↓Iφ , (q
′
, s ′′)].
The intuition is thatA reads the current label in 2max(ψ ), chooses nondeterministically a transition
inWψ , chooses a next state s ′′ in S and proceeds in the corresponding direction s ′′↓Iφ ∈ Sφ .
Now fromA we build the automatonA
φ
s over Sφ -trees labelled with “real” atomic propositions
in AP∃. Intuitively, in each node it visits, A
φ
s guesses what should be its labelling over max(ψ ), it
simulates A accordingly, and checks that the guess it made is correct. If, after having guessed a
finite path u ∈ tS ending in state s
′, A
φ
s guesses that φi holds, it checks this guess by starting a
copy of automatonAφis ′ from node v = u↓Iφ in its input t .
Formally, for each s ′ ∈ S and each φi ∈ max(ψ ) we first build A
φi
s ′ , which works on Sφi -trees.
Observe that Iφ = ∩ki=1Iφi , so that we need to narrow down these automata
2: We let Ais ′ :=
A
φi
s ′ ↓Iφ= (Q
i
s ′, δ
i
s ′ ,q
i
s ′,C
i
s ′). We also let A
i
s ′ = (Q
i
s ′, δ
i
s ′,q
i
s ′,C
i
s ′) be the dualisation of A
i
s ′ , and we
2In the conference version of this work [6] we made a mistake here: we wrote that Iφ = Iφi , which is not the case in
general. As a consequence we do need to narrow down automata, unlike what was written in the conference version.
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assume without loss of generality all the state sets are pairwise disjoint. We define the ATA
A
φ
s = (Q ∪
⋃
i,s ′
Qis ′ ∪Q
i
s ′, δ
′
,qι ,C
′),
where the colours of states are left as they were in their original automaton, and δ ′ is defined as
follows. For states in Qis ′ (resp. Q
i
s ′), δ
′ agrees with δ is ′ (resp. δ
i
s ′ ), and for (q
ψ , s ′) ∈ Q and a ∈ 2AP∃
we let δ ′((qψ , s ′),a) be the disjunction over a′ ∈ 2max(ψ ) of(
δ
(
(qψ , s ′),a′
)
∧
∧
φi ∈a′
δ is ′(q
i
s ′,a) ∧
∧
φi <a′
δ is ′(q
i
s ′,a)
)
. (2)
Note that in general it is not possible to define a max(ψ )-labelling of t that faithfully represents
the truth values of formulas in max(ψ ) for all nodes in tS , because a node in t may correspond
to different nodes in tS that have same projection on Sφ but satisfy different formulas of max(ψ ).
However this is not a problem because different copies of Aφs that visit the same node can guess
different labellings, depending on the actual state of S (which is part of the state of A
φ
s ).
φ = ∃
o
p.φ ′ : We build automaton A
φ′
s that works on Sφ′-trees; because φ is hierarchical, we
have that o ⊆ Iφ′ and we can narrow down A
φ′
s to work on So-trees and obtain A1 := A
φ′
s ↓o .
By Theorem 4.6 we can nondeterminise it to get A2, which by Theorem 4.5 we can project with
respect to p, finally obtaining Aφs := A2 ⇓p .
Correctness.We now prove by induction on φ that the construction is correct. In each case, we
let t = (τ , ℓ) be a complete (AP∃, Sφ )-tree rooted in sι ↓Iφ .
φ = p : First, note that Ip = [n], so that t is rooted in sι ↓Iφ= sι , and u ↓Iφ= u. Also recall
that u ends in s . Let us consider first the case where p ∈ APf . By definition of A
p
s , we have that
(t ,u) ∈ L(A
p
s ) if and only if p ∈ ℓS(s). We also have t ↑
[n] ! tS,u |= p if and only if p ∈ ℓ
′(u),
where ℓ′ is the labelling of tree t ↑[n] ! tS . By definition of unfolding and merge, we have that
ℓ′(u) = ℓS(s), which concludes this direction. Now if p ∈ AP∃: by definition of A
p
s , we have
(t ,u) ∈ L(A
p
s ) if and only if p ∈ ℓ(u); also, by definition of the merge and unfolding, we have that
t ↑[n] ! tS ,u |= p if and only if p ∈ ℓ(u), and we are done.
φ = ¬φ ′ : Correctness follows from the induction hypothesis and Theorem 4.4.
φ1 ∨ φ2 : We have Ai = A
φi
s ↓Iφ , so by Theorem 4.7 we have (t ,u ↓Iφ ) ∈ L(Ai ) if and only if
(t ↑Iφi ,u ↓Iφi ) ∈ L(A
φi
s ), which by induction hypothesis holds if and only if (t ↑
Iφi )↑[n] ! tS,u |=
φi , i.e., t ↑[n] ! tS ,u |= φi . We conclude by observing that L(A
φ
s ) = L(A1) ∪ L(A2).
φ = Eψ : Suppose that t ↑[n] ! tS,u |= Eψ . There exists an infinite path λ in t ↑
[n] ! tS starting
atu such that t ↑[n] ! tS, λ |= ψ . Again, let max(ψ ) be the set ofmaximal state subformulas ofφ, and
letw be the infinite word over 2max(ψ ) that agrees with λ on the state formulas in max(ψ ), i.e., for
each node λk of λ and formulaφi ∈ max(ψ ), it holds that φi ∈ wk if and only if t ↑[n] ! tS, λk |= φi .
To show that (t ,u ↓Iφ ) ∈ L(A
φ
s ) we show that Eve can win the acceptance game G(A
φ
s , t ,u ↓Iφ ).
In this game, Eve can guess the path λ while the automaton follows λ ↓Iφ in its input t , and she
can also guess the corresponding word w on 2max(ψ ). By construction ofWψ , Eve has a winning
strategy σψ in the acceptance game ofWψ onw . From λ,w and σψ we can easily define a strategy
for Eve in G(A
φ
s , t ,u ↓Iφ ) on all positions that can be reached while Adam does not choose to
challenge her on a guess she made for the truth value of some maximal state subformula, and on
such plays this strategy is winning because σψ is winning.
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Now if Adam challenges her on one of these guesses: Let λk ∈ t ↑[n] ! tS be a node along λ, let
s ′ be its last direction and let λ′
k
= λk ↓Iφ ∈ t . Assume that in node λ
′
k
of the input tree, in a state
(qψ , s ′) ∈ Q , Adam challenges Eve on some φi ∈ max(ψ ) that she assumes to be true in λ′k , i.e.,
such that φi ∈ wk . Formally, in the evaluation game this means that Adam chooses the conjunct
δ is ′(q
i
s ′,a) in transition formula 2, where a = ℓ(λ
′
k
), thus moving to position (λ′
k
, (qψ , s ′), δ is ′(q
i
s ′,a)).
We want to show that Eve wins from this position. To do so we first show that (t , λ′
k
) ∈ L(Ais ′).
First, since Ais ′ = A
φi
s ′ ↓Iφ , by Theorem 4.7, (t , λ
′
k
) ∈ L(Ais ′) if and only if (t ↑
Iφi , λk ↓Iφi ) ∈
L(A
φi
s ′ ). Next, by applying the induction hypothesis we get that (t ↑
Iφi , λk ↓Iφi ) ∈ L(A
φi
s ′ ) if and
only if t ↑Iφi↑[n] ! tS , λk |= φi , i.e., t ↑
[n]
! tS, λk |= φi . The latter holds because φi ∈ wk , and by
assumption wk agrees with λk on φi . Thus (t , λ′k ) ∈ L(A
i
s ′).
This means that Eve has a winning strategy from the initial position (λ′
k
,qis ′, δ
i
s ′(q
i
s ′,a)) of the
acceptance game ofAis ′ on (t , λ
′
k
). Since (λ′
k
,qis ′, δ
i
s ′(q
i
s ′,a)) and (λ
′
k
, (qψ , s ′), δ is ′(q
i
s ′,a)) contain the
same node λ′
k
and transition formula δ is ′(q
i
s ′,a), the subgames that start in these positions are
isomorphic and a winning strategy in one of these positions induces a winning strategy in the
other, and therefore Eve wins Adam’s challenge (recall that positional strategies are sufficient in
parity games [82]). With a similar argument, we get that also when Adam challenges Eve on some
φi ∈ max(ψ ) assumed not to be true in node λk , Eve wins the challenge. Finally, Eve wins the
acceptance game ofAφs on (t ,u↓Iφ ), and thus (t ,u↓Iφ ) ∈ L(A
φ
s ).
For the other direction, assume that (t ,u ↓Iφ ) ∈ L(A
φ
s ), i.e., Eve wins the evaluation game of
A
φ
s on (t ,u ↓Iφ ). A winning strategy for Eve describes a path λ in tS from s , which is also a path
in t ↑[n] ! tS from u. This winning strategy also defines an infinite wordw over 2
max(ψ ) such that
w agrees with λ on the formulas in max(ψ ), and it also describes a winning strategy for Eve in the
acceptance game ofWψ onw . Hence t ↑[n] ! tS, λ |= ψ , and t ↑
[n] ! tS,u |= φ.
φ = ∃op.φ ′ : First, by definition we have Iφ = o ∩ Iφ′ . Because φ is hierarchical, o ⊆ o′ for
every o′ that occurs in φ ′, and thus o ⊆ Iφ′ . It follows that Iφ = o. Next, by Theorem 4.5 we have
that
(t ,u↓Iφ ) ∈ L(A
φ
s ) iff ∃ ℓp a p-labelling for t such that (t ⊗ ℓp ,u) ∈ L(A2). (3)
By Theorem 4.6, L(A2) = L(A1), and since A1 = A
φ′
s ↓o= A
φ′
s ↓Iφ we get by Theorem 4.7 that
(t ⊗ ℓp ,u↓Iφ ) ∈ L(A2) iff ((t ⊗ ℓp)↑
Lφ′ ,u↓Iφ′ ) ∈ L(A
φ′
s ). (4)
By induction hypothesis,
((t ⊗ ℓp)↑
Lφ′ ,u↓Iφ′ ) ∈ L(A
φ′
s ) iff (t ⊗ ℓp )↑
Lφ′↑[n] ! tS,u |= φ
′
. (5)
Now, by points (3), (4) and (5) and the fact that (t ⊗ ℓp)↑
Iφ′↑[n]= (t ⊗ ℓp)↑
[n] , we get that
(t ,u↓Iφ ) ∈ L(A
φ
s ) iff ∃ ℓp a p-labelling for t such that (t ⊗ ℓp )↑
[n]
! tS,u |= φ
′
. (6)
We now prove the following equation which, together with point (6), concludes the proof:
∃ ℓp a p-labelling for t such that (t ⊗ ℓp)↑[n] ! tS,u |= φ
′
iff
t ↑[n] ! tS,u |= ∃
op.φ ′
(7)
Assume that there exists a p-labelling ℓp for t such that (t ⊗ ℓp) ↑[n] ! tS,u |= φ
′. Let ℓ′p be
the p-labelling of (t ⊗ ℓp ) ↑[n] ! tS . By definition of the merge, ℓ
′
p is equal to the p-labelling of
(t ⊗ ℓp)↑
[n] , which by definition of the widening is Iφ -uniform, i.e., it is o-uniform. In addition, it
is clear that (t ⊗ ℓp )↑[n] ! tS = (t ↑
[n] ! tS) ⊗ ℓ
′
p , which concludes this direction.
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For the other direction, assume that t ↑[n] ! tS,u |= ∃
op.φ ′: there exists a o-uniform p-labelling
ℓ′p for t ↑
[n] ! tS such that (t ↑
[n] ! tS) ⊗ ℓ
′
p ,u |= φ
′. We define a p-labelling ℓp for t such that
(t ⊗ ℓp)↑
[n] ! tS,u |= φ
′. First, let us write t ′ = t ↑[n] ! tS = (τ
′, ℓ′). For each node u of t , let
ℓp (u) =
{
ℓ′p(u
′) if there exists u ′ ∈ τ ′ such that u ′↓o= u,
0 otherwise.
This is well defined because ℓ′p is o-uniform in p, so that if two nodes u
′,v ′ project on u, we have
u ′ ≈o v
′ and thus ℓ′p(u
′) = ℓ′p(v
′). In case there is no u ′ ∈ τ ′ such that u ′↓Iφ= u, the value of ℓp (u)
has no impact on (t ⊗ ℓp)↑[n] ! tS . Finally, (t ⊗ ℓp)↑
[n] ! tS = (t ↑
[n] ! tS) ⊗ ℓ
′
p , hence the result.

4.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Wenow prove Theorem4.3. LetS be a CKSwith initial state sι , and letΦ ∈ QCTL∗i,⊆ . By Lemma 4.10
one can build an ATA AΦsι such that for every labelled Sφ -tree t rooted in sι ↓Iφ , and every node
u ∈ tS , (t ,u↓Iφ ) ∈ L(A
φ
sι ) if, and only if, t ↑
[n] ! tS,u |= Φ.
Let τ be the full Sφ -tree rooted in sι ↓Iφ , and let t = (τ , ℓ∅), where ℓ∅ is the empty labelling.
Clearly, t ↑[n] ! tS = tS , and because t is rooted in sι ↓Iφ , we get that t ∈ L(A
φ
sι ) if, and only if
tS |= Φ, i.e., S |= Φ. It remains to check whether tree t , which is regular, is accepted by A
Φ
sι
. This
can be done by solving a parity game built from the product ofAΦsι with a finite Kripke structure
representing t [57].
4.4 Complexity
To state a precise upper bound on the complexity of our procedure, we first introduce a syntac-
tic notion of simulation depth for formulas of SLii. While alternation depth (see, e.g., [60]) simply
counts the number of alternations between existential and universal strategy quantifications, sim-
ulation depth reflects automata operations required to treat a formula, and counts the maximum
number of nested simulations of alternating tree automata that need to be performed when ap-
plying our automata construction. However, like alternation depth, it is a purely syntactic notion.
Formally we define a function sd : QCTL∗ii → N × {nd, alt} which returns, for each formula φ, a
pair sd(φ) = (k, x) where k is the simulation depth of φ, and x ∈ {nd, alt} indicates whether the
automaton A
φ
s built from φ and a state s of a CKS S is nondeterministic (nd) or alternating (alt).
If sd(φ) = (k, x) we shall denote k by sdk (φ) and x by sdx (φ). The inductive definition for state
formulas is as follows:
sd(p) := (0, nd)
sd(¬φ) := (sdk (φ), alt)
sd(φ1 ∨ φ2) :=
(
maxi ∈{1,2} sdk (φi ), x
)
,
where x =
{
nd if sdx (φ1) = sdx (φ2) = nd
alt otherwise
sd(Eψ ) :=
{
(0, nd) ifψ ∈ LTL
(maxφ∈max(ψ ) sdk (φ), alt) otherwise
sd(∃op.φ) := (k, nd),
where k =
{
sdk (φ) if sdx (φ) = nd and o = Iφ (recall Definition 4.8)
sdk (φ) + 1 otherwise
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We explain each case. For an atomic propositionp, the automatonA
p
s is clearly nondeterministic
and no simulation is involved in its construction. For a formula¬φ, the automatonA¬φs is obtained
by dualising A
φ
s , an operation that in general does not return a nondeterministic automaton but
an alternating one; also this dualisation does not involve any simulation, hence the definition of
the first component. Now for the disjunction, the first component should be clear; for the second
one, observe that by construction of A
φ1∨φ2
s , if both A
φ1
s and A
φ2
s are nondeterministic, then so
is A
φ1∨φ2
s ; otherwise, it is alternating. For the path quantifier, by construction A
Eψ
s is alternating
in the general case as it starts copies of automata for each maximal state subformula inψ ; for the
first component, we recall that max(ψ ) denotes the set of these maximal state subformulas and we
observe that no additional simulation is performed to buildA
Eψ
s besides those needed to construct
the automata for the maximal state subformulas. If ψ is an LTL formula, then one can build the
nondeterministic word automaton Wψ directly working on “real” atomic propositions in AP∃ ∪
APf . The automatonA can then be built working directly on AP∃, withWψ reading valuations for
AP∃ in the input tree and those for atoms in APf in the current state of S. Because we do not need
to guess valuations of maximal state subformulas and launch additional automata to check that
these guesses are correct, we obtain a nondeterministic automaton. Finally, for a formula of the
form ∃op.φ, to build automaton A
∃
op . φ
s we first build A
φ
s , which we then narrow down to work
on Lo-trees. Since the narrowing operation introduces alternation, we need to nondeterminise the
resulting automaton before projecting it with respect to p. Now observe that if Iφ = o we do not
need to perform this narrowing, and thus if A
φ
s is a nondeterministic automaton we can directly
perform the projection. This justifies the definition of the first component; for the second one,
observe that the projection of a nondeterministic automaton is also nondeterministic.
Example 4.11. Assume that n = 3, i.e., states of CKS have three components (recall that [3] =
{1, 2, 3}). Let us consider formula φ = ∀{1,3}p. ∀[3]q. ∃[3]r . EG(p ∧ q ∨ r ). We describe how its
simulation depth is computed. First, let us rewrite φ = ¬∃{1,3}p. ∃[3]q.¬∃[3]r . EG(p ∧ q ∨ r ).
Since G(p ∧q ∨ r ) is an LTL formula, sd(EG(p ∧q ∨ r )) = (0, nd). Next, because IEG(p∧q∨r ) = [3],
it follows that sd(∃[3]r . EG(p ∧ q ∨ r )) = (0, nd), and sd(¬∃[3]r . EG(p ∧ q ∨ r )) = (0, alt). Next
we have that sd(∃[3]q.¬∃[3]r . EG(p ∧ q ∨ r )) = (1, nd). This reflects the fact that the automa-
ton obtained for formula ¬∃[3]r . EG(p ∧ q ∨ r ), which is alternating because of complementa-
tion, needs to be simulated before projecting it over q. Then, because {1, 3} , [3], it holds that
sd(∃{1,3}p. ∃[3]q.¬∃[3]r . EG(p ∧ q ∨ r )) = (2, nd): to project over p we first need to narrow down
the previous automaton to make it see only components 1 and 3, and because the narrowing op-
eration introduces alternation, the resulting automaton needs to be simulated before projecting it.
Finally, we get that sd(φ) = (2, alt)
We now introduce two additional depth measures on QCTL∗ii formulas, which help us establish
more precise upper bounds on the sizes of the automata we build. For every QCTL∗ii formula φ, we
let Ed(φ) be the maximum number of nested path quantifiers E in φ, and ∃d(φ) is the maximum
number of nested second-order quantifiers ∃ in φ. We also inductively define the function exp
(
k |
n
)
, for k,n ∈ N, as follows: exp
(
0 | n
)
:= n and exp
(
k + 1 | n
)
:= 2exp
(
k |n
)
.
Proposition 4.12. Let Φ be a QCTL∗i,⊆ formula, S a CKS and s ∈ S a state.
• If sdk (Φ) = 0,AΦs has at most f
Φ
S
states and 2 colours, and
• if sdk (Φ) ≥ 1, A
Φ
s has at most exp
(
sdk (Φ) | f
Φ
S
log f Φ
S
)
states and its number of colours is at
most exp
(
sdk (Φ) − 1 | f ΦS log f
Φ
S
)
,
where f Φ
S
=m
∃d(Φ)
1 |Φ| |S|
Ed(Φ)2m2 |Φ |Ed(Φ) , withm1,m2 ∈ N constants.
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Also, ifA
φ
s has state setQ then for each q ∈ Q and a ∈ 2
AP∃(Φ) we have |δ (q,a)| ≤ |S||Q | |S |2H |φ | ,
where H = 1 + Ed(φ).
Constants m1 and m2 are derived from constants in the complexity of, respectively, the simu-
lation procedure, and the procedure that builds a nondeterministic word automaton for an LTL
formula. For more detail, see the proof of Proposition 4.12 in Appendix A.
From this we get the following complexity result.
Proposition 4.13. The model-checking problem forQCTL∗i,⊆ formulas of simulation depth at most
k is (k + 1)-Exptime-complete.
Proof. We start with the upper bounds. For an instance (Φ,S), our decision procedure in Sec-
tion 4.3 first builds automatonAΦsι , and concludes by testing whether the full SΦ-tree with empty
labelling t is accepted by AΦsι . This can be done in time O((|A
Φ
sι
| · |t |)l ), where |t | is the size of a
smallest Kripke structure representing the regular tree t , |AΦsι | is the sum of the number of states
and sizes of formulas in the transition function of AΦsι , and l the number of colours it uses [57].
Clearly t can be represented by a Kripke structure of size |SΦ |, so that |t | ≤ |SΦ | ≤ |S|.
By Proposition 4.12, each formula in the transition function ofAΦsι is of size atmost |S||Q |
|S |2H |Φ | ,
whereQ is the set of states inAΦsι andH = 1+Ed(Φ). There are at most |Q |2
|AP∃(Φ) | such formulas3
and |AP∃(Φ)| ≤ |Φ|, so that |AΦsι | ≤ |Q | + |Q |2
|AP∃(Φ) | |S||Q | |S |2H |Φ | ≤ 2|S||Q | |S |+12(H+1) |Φ | . Also
H + 1 ≤ |Φ|, so we finally have |AΦsι | ≤ 2|S||Q |
|S |+12 |Φ |
2
.
If k = 0, by Proposition 4.12 AΦsι has at most f
Φ
S
states and 2 colours, and f Φ
S
is polynomial in
|S| but exponential in |Φ|. Therefore |AΦsι | is exponential in |Φ| and in |S|, and so is the complexity
of checking that t is accepted byAΦsι .
If k ≥ 1, by Proposition 4.12, |Q | is k-exponential in f Φ
S
log f Φ
S
, and f Φ
S
log f Φ
S
itself is polynomial
in |S| but exponential in |Φ|. As a result, |AΦsι | is (k+1)-exponential in |Φ| and k-exponential in |S|.
Finally, still by Proposition 4.12, the number of colours l is (k−1)-exponential in f Φ
S
log f Φ
S
, hencek-
exponential in |Φ|. Checking that t is accepted byAΦsι can thus be done in time (k+1)-exponential
in |Φ|, and k-exponential in |S|, which finishes to establish the upper bounds.
For the lower bounds, consider the fragment EQkCTL∗ of QCTL∗ (with perfect information)
which consists in formulas in prenex normal form, i.e., with all second-order quantifications at
the beginning, with at most k alternations between existential and universal quantifiers, counting
the first quantifier as one alternation (see [53, p.8] for a formal definition). Clearly, EQkCTL∗ is a
fragment of QCTL∗ii (with n = 1), and formulas of EQ
kCTL∗ have simulation depth at most k . It is
proved in [53] that model checking EQkCTL∗ is (k + 1)-Exptime-hard. 
Remark 3. One may wonder why we do not get our lower bounds from the distributed synthesis
problem in systems with hierarchical information. The reason is that this problem is k-Exptime-
complete for LTL or CTL∗ specifications [50, 69] and can be expressed with formulas of simulation
depth k , and thus would only provide k-Exptime lower-bounds for simulation depth k , while our
problem is k + 1-Exptime-complete. This may seem surprising, but we point out that thanks to
alternation of existential and universal quantifiers, QCTL∗ii formulas with simulation depth k can
express more complex problems than classic distributed synthesis, such as existence of Nash equi-
libria (see Section 7.1).
Improved upper bound.We now refine the previous result by observing that some subformulas
can be model-checked independently in a bottom-up labelling algorithm which uses the above
3In fact the final automaton AΦsι does not read anything in its input, hence the alphabet could be considered to be a
singleton. We thus have only |Q | different formulas in the transition function, at most.
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model-checking procedure as a subroutine. The height of exponential of the overall procedure for
a formula Φ is thus determined by the maximal simulation-depth of the successive independent
subformulasφ treated by the labelling algorithm, instead of the simulation depth of the full formula
Φ. To make this precise we define the simulation number of a sentence, akin to the alternation
number introduced in [60].
Let Φ ∈ QCTL∗ii, and assume without loss of generality that AP∃(Φ) ∩ APf (Φ) = ∅. A state sub-
formula φ of Φ is a subsentence if no atom quantified in Φ appears free in φ, i.e., φ is a subsentence
of Φ if AP∃(Φ) ∩ APf (φ) = ∅.4 The simulation number sn(Φ) of a QCTL
∗
ii formula Φ is the maxi-
mal simulation depth of Φ’s subsentences, where the simulation depth is computed by considering
strict subsentences as atoms.
Note that because temporal operators of SLii can only talk about the future, the truth value
of a subsentence in a node u of an unfolding tS only depends on the current state last(u). The
bottom-up labelling algorithm for an instance (Φ,S) thus consists in iteratively model checking
innermore subsentences of Φ in all states of S, marking the states where they hold with fresh
atomic propositions with which the corresponding subsentences are replaced in Φ.
Proposition 4.14. The model-checking problem for QCTL∗i,⊆ formulas of simulation number at
most k is (k + 1)-Exptime-complete.
5 MODEL-CHECKING HIERARCHICAL INSTANCES OF SLII
In this section we establish that the model-checking problem for SLii restricted to the class of
hierarchical instances is decidable (Theorem 2.9).
5.1 Reduction to QCTL∗ii
We build upon the proof in [54] that establishes the decidability of the model-checking problem
for ATL∗sc by reduction to the model-checking problem for QCTL
∗. The main difference is that we
reduce to themodel-checkingproblem forQCTL∗ii instead, using quantifiers on atomic propositions
parameterised with observations that reflect the ones used in the SLii model-checking instance.
Let (G,Φ) be a hierarchical instance of the SLii model-checking problem, and assume without
loss of generality that each strategy variable is quantified at most once in Φ. We define an equiva-
lent instance of the model-checking problem for QCTL∗i,⊆ .
Constructing the CKS SG . We define SG so that (indistinguishable) nodes in its tree-unfolding
correspond to (indistinguishable) finite plays in G. The CKS will make use of atomic propositions
APv := {pv | v ∈ V } (that we assume to be disjoint from AP). The idea is that pv allows theQCTL∗ii
formula (Φ) ∅s to refer to the current position v in G. Later we will see that (Φ)
∅
s will also make use
of atomic propositions APc := {pxc | c ∈ Ac and x ∈ Var} that we assume, again, are disjoint from
AP ∪ APv . This allows the formula to use pxc to refer to the actions c advised by strategies x .
Suppose Obs = {o1, . . . ,on}, and let G = (Ac,V , E, ℓ,vι,O). For i ∈ [n], define the local states
Li := {[v]oi | v ∈ V } where [v]o is the equivalence class of v for relation ∼o . Since we need to
know the actual position of the CGSii to define the dynamics, we also let Ln+1 := V .
Define the CKS SG := (S,R, sι , ℓ′) where
• S := {sv | v ∈ V },
• R := {(sv , sv ′) | ∃c ∈ AcAg s.t. E(v,c) = v ′} ⊆ S2,
• sι := svι ,
• ℓ′(sv ) := ℓ(v) ∪ {pv } ⊆ AP ∪ APv ,
and sv := ([v]o1, . . . , [v]on ,v) ∈
∏
i ∈[n+1] Li .
4Observe that since we always assume that AP∃(Φ) ∩ APf (Φ) = ∅, Φ is a subsentence of itself.
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For every finite play ρ = v0 . . .vk , define the node uρ := sv0 . . . svk in tSG (which exists, by
definition ofSG and of tree unfoldings). Note that themapping ρ 7→ uρ defines a bijection between
the set of finite plays and the set of nodes in tSG .
Constructing the QCTL∗i,⊆ formulas (φ)
f
s . We now describe how to transform an SLii formula
φ and a partial function f : Ag ⇀ Var into a QCTL∗ii formula (φ)
f
s (that will also depend on
G). Suppose that Ac = {c1, . . . , cl }, and define (φ)
f
s and (ψ )
f
p by mutual induction on state and
path formulas. The base cases are as follows: (p)
f
s := p and (φ)
f
p := (φ)
f
s . Boolean and temporal
operators are simply obtained by distributing the translation: (¬φ) fs := ¬(φ)
f
s , (¬ψ )
f
p := ¬(ψ )
f
p ,
(φ1 ∨ φ2)
f
s := (φ1)
f
s ∨ (φ2)
f
s , (ψ1 ∨ ψ2)
f
p := (ψ1)
f
p ∨ (ψ2)
f
p , (Xψ )
f
p := X(ψ )
f
p and (ψ1Uψ2)
f
p :=
(ψ1)
f
p U(ψ2)
f
p .
We continue with the case of the strategy quantifier:
(〈〈x〉〉oφ)
f
s := ∃
o˜pxc1 . . . ∃
o˜pxcl .φstr(x) ∧ (φ)
f
s
where φstr(x) := AG
∨
c ∈Ac p
x
c
and o˜i := {j | O(oi ) ⊆ O(oj )}.
The intuition is that for each possible action c ∈ Ac, an existential quantification on the atomic
proposition pxc “chooses” for each node uρ of the tree tSG whether strategy x allows action c in
ρ or not, and it does so uniformly with regards to observation o˜. φstr(x) checks that at least one
action is allowed in each node, and thus that atomic propositions pxc indeed define a strategy.
We define o˜i as {j | O(oi ) ⊆ O(oj )} instead of {i} in order to obtain a hierarchical instance.
Note that including all coarser observations does not increase the information accessible to the
quantifier: indeed, two nodes are {i}-indistinguishable if and only if they are o˜i -indistinguishable.
Here are the remaining cases:
((a, x)φ)
f
s := (φ)
f [a 7→x ]
s for x ∈ Var ∪ {?}
and (Eψ )
f
s := E (ψ
f
out ∧ (ψ )
f
p )
where ψ fout := G
∨
v ∈V
(
pv ∧
∨
c ∈AcAg
∧
a∈dom(f ) p
f (a)
ca
∧ XpE(v,c )
)
.
ψ
f
out checks that each player a in the domain of f follows the strategy coded by the p
f (a)
c .
Remark 4. If we consider the fragment of SLii that only allows for deterministic strategies, the
translation can be adapted by simply replacing formulaφstr(x) above with its deterministic variant
φdetstr (x) := AG
∨
c ∈Ac
(pxc ∧
∧
c ′,c
¬pxc ′),
which ensures that exactly one action is chosen for strategy x in each finite play, and thus that
atomic propositions pxc characterise a deterministic strategy.
To prove correctness of the translation, given a strategy σ and a strategy variable x we let
ℓxσ := {ℓpxc | c ∈ Ac} be the family of p
x
c -labellings for tree tSG defined as follows: for each finite
play ρ in G and c ∈ Ac, we let ℓpxc (uρ ) := 1 if c ∈ σ (ρ), 0 otherwise. For a labelled tree t with same
domain as tSG we write t ⊗ ℓ
x
σ for t ⊗ ℓpxc1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ ℓp
x
cl
.
Given an infinite play π and a point i ∈ N, we also let λπ ,i be the infinite path in tSG that starts
in node uπ≤i and is defined as λπ ,i := uπ≤iuπ≤i+1uπ≤i+2 . . .
Finally, for an assignment χ and a partial function f : Ag ⇀ Var, we say that f is compatible
with χ if dom(χ) ∩ Ag = dom(f ) and for all a ∈ dom(f ), χ(a) = χ(f (a)).
ACM Trans. Comput. Logic, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: March 2020.
28 R. Berthon, B. Maubert, A. Murano, S. Rubin and M. Y. Vardi
Proposition 5.1. For every state subformula φ and path subformulaψ of Φ, finite play ρ, infinite
play π , point i ∈ N, for every assignment χ variable-complete for φ (resp. ψ ) and partial function
f : Ag ⇀ Var compatible with χ , assuming also that no xi in dom(χ) ∩ Var = {x1, . . . , xk } is
quantified in φ orψ , we have
G, χ , ρ |= φ if and only if tSG ⊗ ℓ
x1
χ (x1)
⊗ . . . ⊗ ℓ
xk
χ (xk )
,uρ |= (φ)
f
s
G, χ , π , i |= ψ if and only if tSG ⊗ ℓ
x1
χ (x1)
⊗ . . . ⊗ ℓ
xk
χ (xk )
, λπ ,i |= (ψ )
f
p
In addition, SG is of size linear in |G|, and (φ)
f
s and (ψ )
f
p are of size linear in |G|
2
+ |φ |.
Proof. The proof is by induction on φ. We detail the cases for binding, strategy quantification
and outcome quantification, the others follow simply by definition of SG for atomic propositions
and induction hypothesis for remaining cases.
For φ = (a, x)φ ′, we have G, χ , ρ |= (a, x)φ ′ if and only if G, χ[a 7→ χ(x)], ρ |= φ ′. The result
follows by using the induction hypothesis with assignment χ[a 7→ x] and function f [a 7→ x]. This
is possible because f [a 7→ x] is compatible with χ[a 7→ x]: indeed dom(χ[a 7→ x]) ∩ Ag is equal
to dom(χ) ∩ Ag ∪ {a} which, by assumption, is equal to dom(f ) ∪ {a} = dom(f [a 7→ x]). Also
by assumption, for all a′ ∈ dom(f ), χ(a′) = χ(f (a′)), and by definition χ[a 7→ χ(x)](a) = χ(x) =
χ(f [a 7→ x](a)).
For φ = 〈〈x〉〉oφ ′, assume first that G, χ , ρ |= 〈〈x〉〉oφ ′. There exists an o-uniform strategy σ such
that
G, χ[x 7→ σ ], ρ |= φ ′.
Since f is compatible with χ , it is also compatible with assignment χ ′ = χ[x 7→ σ ]. By assumption,
no variable in {x1, . . . , xk } is quantified in φ, so that x , xi for all i , and thus χ ′(xi ) = χ(xi ) for all
i ; and because no strategy variable is quantified twice in a same formula, x is not quantified in φ ′,
so that no variable in {x1, . . . , xk , x} is quantified in φ ′. By induction hypothesis
tSG ⊗ ℓ
x1
χ ′(x1)
⊗ . . . ⊗ ℓ
xk
χ ′(xk )
⊗ ℓx
χ ′(x )
,uρ |= (φ
′)
f
s .
Because σ is o-uniform, each ℓpxc ∈ ℓ
x
σ = ℓ
x
χ ′(x )
is o˜-uniform, and it follows that
tSG ⊗ ℓ
x1
χ ′(x1)
⊗ . . . ⊗ ℓ
xk
χ ′(xk )
,uρ |= ∃
o˜pxc1 . . . ∃
o˜pxcl .φstr(x) ∧ (φ
′)
f
s .
Finally, since χ ′(xi ) = χ(xi ) for all i , we conclude that
tSG ⊗ ℓ
x1
χ (x1)
⊗ . . . ⊗ ℓ
xk
χ (xk )
,uρ |= (〈〈x〉〉
oφ ′)
f
s .
For the other direction, assume that
tSG ⊗ ℓ
x1
χ (x1)
⊗ . . . ⊗ ℓ
xk
χ (xk )
,uρ |= (φ)
f
s ,
and recall that (φ)
f
s = ∃
o˜pxc1 . . . ∃
o˜pxcl .φstr(x) ∧ (φ
′)
f
s . Write t = tSG ⊗ ℓ
x1
χ (x1)
⊗ . . . ⊗ ℓ
xk
χ (xk )
. There
exist o˜-uniform ℓpxc -labellings such that
t ⊗ ℓpxc1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ ℓp
x
cl
|= φstr(x) ∧ (φ
′)
f
s .
By φstr(x), these labellings code for a strategy σ , and because they are o˜-uniform, σ is o-uniform.
Let χ ′ = χ[x 7→ σ ]. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k , by assumption x , xi , and thus χ ′(xi ) = χ(xi ). The above
can thus be rewritten
tSG ⊗ ℓ
x1
χ ′(x1)
⊗ . . . ⊗ ℓ
xk
χ ′(xk )
⊗ ℓxχ ′(x ) |= φstr(x) ∧ (φ
′)
f
s .
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By induction hypothesis we have G, χ[x 7→ σ ], ρ |= φ ′, hence G, χ , ρ |= 〈〈x〉〉oφ ′.
For φ = Eψ , assume first that G, χ , ρ |= Eψ . There exists a play π ∈ Out(χ , ρ) such that
G, χ , π , |ρ | − 1 |= ψ . By induction hypothesis, tSG ⊗ ℓ
x1
χ (x1)
⊗ . . . ⊗ ℓ
xk
χ (xk )
, λπ , |ρ |−1 |= (ψ )
f
p . Since π is
an outcome of χ , each agent a ∈ dom(χ) ∩Ag follows strategy χ(a) in π . Because dom(χ) ∩Ag =
dom(f ) and for all a ∈ dom(f ), χ(a) = χ(f (a)), each agenta ∈ dom(f ) follows the strategy χ(f (a)),
which is coded by atoms pf (a)c in the translation of Φ. Therefore λπ , |ρ |−1 also satisfies ψ
χ
out, hence
tSG ⊗ ℓ
x1
χ (x1)
⊗ . . . ⊗ ℓ
xk
χ (xk )
, λπ , |ρ |−1 |= ψ
χ
out ∧ (ψ )
f
p , and we are done.
For the other direction, assume that tSG ⊗ ℓ
x1
χ (x1)
⊗ . . . ⊗ ℓ
xk
χ (xk )
,uρ |= E(ψ
f
out ∧ (ψ )
f
p ). There
exists a path λ in tSG ⊗ ℓ
x1
χ (x1)
⊗ . . . ⊗ ℓ
xk
χ (xk )
starting in node uρ that satisfies both ψ
f
out and (ψ )
f
p .
By construction of SG there exists an infinite play π such that π≤ |ρ |−1 = ρ and λ = λπ , |ρ |−1. By
induction hypothesis, G, χ , π , |ρ | − 1 |= ψ . Because λπ , |ρ |−1 satisfies ψ
f
out, dom(χ) ∩ Ag = dom(f ),
and for all a ∈ dom(f ), χ(a) = χ(f (a)), it is also the case that π ∈ Out(χ , ρ), hence G, χ , ρ |= Eψ .
The size of SG , (φ)
f
s and (ψ )
f
p are easily verified. 
Applying Proposition 5.1 to the sentence Φ, ρ = vι , any assignment χ , and the empty function
∅, we get:
G |= Φ if and only if tSG |= (Φ)
∅
s .
Preserving hierarchy. To complete the proof of Theorem 2.9 it remains to check that (Φ) ∅s is a
hierarchical QCTL∗ii formula, which is the case because Φ is hierarchical in G and for every two
observations oi and oj in Obs such that O(oi ) ⊆ O(oj ), by definition of o˜k we have that o˜i ⊆ o˜j .
5.2 Complexity
We now establish the complexity of model checking hierarchical instances of SLii. As we did for
QCTL∗ii, we first define the simulation depth of SLii state formulas. In the following inductive defi-
nition, Oφ denotes the intersection of all indistinguishability relations used in φ: Oφ := ∩o∈φO(o),
with the empty intersection being defined as the identity relation (perfect information). Also, for
a path formulaψ , max(ψ ) is the set of maximal state subformulas inψ .
sd(p) := (0, nd) sd(¬φ) := (sdk (φ), alt)
sd(φ1 ∨ φ2) :=
(
maxi ∈{1,2} sdk (φi ), x
)
,
where x =
{
nd if sdx (φ1) = sdx (φ2) = nd
alt otherwise
sd(〈〈x〉〉oφ) := (k, nd),
where k =
{
sdk (φ) if sdx (φ) = nd and O(o) = Oφ
sdk (φ) + 1 otherwise
sd((a, x)φ) := sd(φ)
sd(Eψ ) :=
{
(0, nd) ifψ ∈ LTL
(maxφ∈max(ψ ) sdk (φ), alt) otherwise
Proposition 5.2. The model-checking problem for hierarchical instances of SLii of simulation
depth at most k is (k + 1)-Exptime-complete.
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Proof. The upper bounds follow from the fact that the translated formulas in our reduction
have essentially the same simulation depth as the original ones. However this is not quite right,
because in the case where sdx (φ) = nd and O(o) = Oφ we have sd(〈〈x〉〉oφ) = (sdk (φ), nd), while
sd((〈〈x〉〉oφ) fs ) = (sdk ((φ)
f
s ) + 1, nd): indeed, while it is the case that O(o) = Oφ implies that
o˜ = I
(φ)
f
s
, the translation introduces a conjunction with φstr(x), and even when sdx ((φ)
f
s ) = nd, we
have sdx (φstr(x)∧(φ)
f
s ) = alt. According to Proposition 4.13, this should thus induce an additional
exponential to check the translated formula.However, this can be avoided by noticing that the fixed
formula φstr(x) = AG
∨
c ∈Ac p
x
c can be checked by a simple deterministic tree automaton with two
states qcheck and qrej: the automaton starts in state qcheck, which is accepting (it has parity zero);
when it visits a node u in state qcheck, if ℓ(u) satisfies
∨
c ∈Ac p
x
c , then the automaton sends state
qcheck to all children ofu, otherwise it sends the state qrej to all children. State qrej is rejecting (it has
parity one) and is a sink: it sends itself to all children, independently on the label of the visited node.
If we restrict SLii to deterministic strategies, the same observation can bemade: the automaton that
checks formulaφdetstr (x) = AG
∨
c ∈Ac(p
x
c ∧
∧
c ′,c ¬p
x
c ′) is the same as the one described above, except
that it checks whether
∨
c ∈Ac(p
x
c ∧
∧
c ′,c ¬p
x
c ′) is satisfied by the label of the current node.
Given two tree automataA1 andA2, one deterministic and one nondeterministic, one can easily
build a nondeterministic automaton A1 ∩ A2 of size |A1 | × |A2 | that accepts the intersection of
their languages, so that in this case the conjunction does not introduce alternation, and thus we
do not need an additional simulation before projecting to guess the strategy. We could refine the
notion of simulation depth to reflect this, but we find that it would become very cumbersome for
little added benefit, so we keep this observation in this proof.
The lower bounds are inherited from QCTL∗ii thanks to the polynomial reduction presented in
Section 6.2.2, which preserves simulation depth. 
We point out that all instances of the model-checking problem for the perfect-information frag-
ment are hierarchical, and thus this result provides improved upper-bounds for SL, which was only
known to be in k-Exptime for formulas of length at most k [60]. Also the lower bounds forQCTL∗ii
are inherited directly from the perfect-information fragmentQCTL∗, which reduces to the perfect-
information fragment of SLii following the construction from Section 6.2.2. Therefore the lower
bounds hold already for the perfect-information fragment of SLii. Note however that this does not
provide lower bounds for the usual, linear-time variant of Strategy Logic, where path quantifiers
inQCTL∗ formulas must be simulated with strategy quantifications which increase the simulation
depth of the resulting Strategy Logic formulas. The exact complexity of the linear-time variant is
not known, even in the perfect-information case.
Simulation number. The intuition behind the alternation number as considered in [60] is to
refine the classic alternation depth between existential and universal quantifiers by observing that
subsentences of a sentence Φ to model-check can be treated independently thanks to a bottom-up
labelling algorithm: innermost sentences are evaluated in all states of the model and replaced in
Φ by atomic propositions that label the states where they hold. The alternation number of Φ is
the maximum alternation depth of the successive subsentences that are treated by this bottom-up
procedure, and it determines the complexity of the overall model-checking procedure.
However, as discussed in Remark 1, the semantics of the outcome quantifier makes sentences
sensitive to the assignment in which they are evaluated. As a result, to define the notion of al-
ternation number in our setting, we introduce a notion of independent subsentence. Intuitively, a
subsentence φ of a sentence Φ is independent if it redefines or unbinds the strategies of all players
who are bound to a strategy when φ is reached in the evaluation of Φ. More precisely, we say that
an agent a is bound in a syntactic subformula φ of Φ if the path that leads to φ in Φ’s syntactic
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tree contains a binding operator (a, x) for a which is not followed by an unbinding (a, ?) for her.
A subsentence φ of Φ is independent if all agents that are bound in φ are either rebound by an
operator (a, x) or unbound by an operator (a, ?) before any outcome quantifier is met in φ. In an
independent subsentence φ, the semantics of the outcome quantifier does not depend on strate-
gies that are quantified outside φ, and in fact a subsentence φ of Φ is independent if and only if the
formula that corresponds to φ in (Φ) ∅s is a subsentence of (Φ)
∅
s .
Similarly to what we did for QCTL∗ii we now define the simulation number sn(Φ) of an SLii
sentence Φ as the maximum of the simulation depths for independent subsentences, where strict
independent subsentences are counted as atoms.
Lemma 5.3. For every hierarchical instance (G,Φ) of SLii, sn(Φ) = sn((Φ) ∅s ).
The following then follows from Proposition 5.1, Lemma 5.3 and Proposition 4.14.
Proposition 5.4. The model-checking problem for hierarchical instances of SLii of simulation
number at most k is (k + 1)-Exptime-complete.
We now compare the latter result with the complexity of model checking SL[NG], the nested
goal fragment of Strategy Logic with perfect information (we refer the interested reader to [60]
for a definition of this fragment). It is established in [21, 60] that this problem is in (k+1)-Exptime
for formulas of alternation number k . We remark that the simulation number of an SL[NG] for-
mula translated in our branching-time version of SL (this is done by adding outcome quantifiers
between bindings and temporal operators) is equal to its alternation number plus one, and thus
Proposition 5.4 gives a (k + 2)-Exptime upper bound for SL[NG] formulas of alternation number
k . In [21, 60] the extra exponential is avoided by resorting to universal and nondeterministic tree
automata, depending on whether the innermost strategy quantification is existential or univer-
sal, to deal with temporal formulas. Thus, the innermost strategy quantification can be dealt with
without incurring an exponential blowup.
The same thing cannot be done for SLii, for two reasons. The first one is that in general the
innermost strategy quantification may have imperfect information and thus require a narrowing of
the automaton; this operation introduces alternation, which needs to be removed at the cost of one
exponential before dealing with strategy quantification. The second reason is that even when the
innermost strategy has perfect information, the outcome quantifier that we introduce in Strategy
Logic allows the expression of CTL∗ formulas which cannot be dealt with by nondeterministic and
universal automata as is done in [21, 60].
6 COMPARISON WITH RELATED LOGICS
In this section we first show that SLii subsumes SL and the main imperfect-information extensions
of ATL. Then we show that model checking Coordination Logic (CL) reduces to model checking
hierarchical instances of SLii where the truth of all atomic propositions in the model is known by
all agents (or more precisely, all observations in the concurrent game structures are fine enough
to observe the truth value of all atomic propositions).
6.1 Comparison with ATL
The main difference between SL and ATL-like strategic logics is that in the latter a strategy is al-
ways bound to some player, while in the former bindings and quantifications are separated. This
separation adds expressive power, e.g., one can bind the same strategy to different players. Extend-
ing ATL with imperfect-information is done by giving each player an indistinguishability relation
that its strategies must respect [15]. In SLii instead each strategy x is assigned an indistinguishabil-
ity relationowhen it is quantified. Associating observations to strategies rather than players allows
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us to obtain a logic SLii that is a clean generalisation of (perfect-information) SL, and subsumes
imperfect-information extensions of ATL∗ that associate observations to players. Concerning SL,
it is rather easy to see that every sentence in SL has an equivalent in the fragment of SLii with
deterministic strategies where all observation symbols are interpreted as perfect information. We
now prove that SLii also subsumes ATL∗ with imperfect information.
Proposition 6.1. For every ATL∗i,R formula
5 φ there is an SLii formula φ ′ such that for every CGSii
G there is a CGSii G
′ such that G |= φ if, and only if, G′ |= φ ′.
We recall that an ATL∗i,R formula 〈A〉ψ reads as “there are strategies for players in A such thatψ
holds whatever players in Ag\A do”. Formulaφ ′ is built fromφ by replacing each subformula of the
form 〈A〉ψ , whereA = {a1, . . . ,ak } ⊂ Ag is a coalition of players and Ag\A = {ak+1, . . . ,an} with
formula 〈〈x1〉〉o1 . . . 〈〈xk 〉〉ok (a1, x1) . . . (ak , xk )(ak+1, ?) . . . (an , ?)Aψ ′, whereψ ′ is the translation of
ψ . Then G′ is obtained from G by interpreting each oi as the equivalence relation for player i in
G, and interpreting op as the identity relation.
Third, SLii also subsumes the imperfect-information extension of ATL∗ with strategy context
(see [55] for the definition of ATL∗sc with partial observation, which we refer to as ATL
∗
sc,i).
Proposition 6.2. For every ATL∗sc,i formula φ there is an SLii formula φ
′ such that for every CGSii
G there is a CGSii G
′ such that G |= φ if, and only if, G′ |= φ ′.
The only difference between ATL∗sc,i and ATL
∗
i,R is the following: in ATL
∗
i,R, when a subformula
of the form 〈A〉ψ is met, we quantify existentially on strategies for players in A and quantify
universally on possible outcomes obtained by letting other players behave however they want.
Therefore, if any player in Ag \A had previously been assigned a strategy, it is forgotten. In ATL∗sc,i
on the other hand, these strategies are stored in a strategy context, which is a partial assignment
χ , defined for the subset of players currently bound to a strategy. A strategy context allows one to
quantify universally only on strategies of players who are not inA and who are not already bound
to a strategy. It is then easy to adapt the translation presented for Proposition 6.1: it suffices not
to unbind agents outside the coalition from their strategies. G′ is defined as for Proposition 6.1.
6.2 Comparison with Coordination Logic
There is a natural and simple translation of instances of the model-checking problem of CL [32]
into the hierarchical instances of SLii. Moreover, the image of this translation consists of instances
of SLii with a very restricted form: atoms mentioned in the SLii-formula are observable by all
observations of the CGSii, i.e., for all o ∈ Obs and p ∈ AP, v ∼o v ′ implies that p ∈ ℓ(v) iff
p ∈ ℓ(v ′).
Proposition 6.3. There is an effective translation that, given a CL-instance (S,φ) produces a
hierarchical SLii-instance (G,Φ) such that
(1) S |= φ if, and only if, G |= Φ,
(2) For all atoms p ∈ AP and observations o ∈ Obs, v ∼o v ′ implies that p ∈ ℓ(v) iff p ∈ ℓ(v ′).
To do this, one first translates CL into (hierarchical) QCTL∗ii, the latter is defined in the next
section. This step is a simple reflection of the semantics of CL in that ofQCTL∗ii. Then one translates
QCTL∗ii into SLii by a simple adaptation of the translation of QCTL
∗ into ATL∗sc [54].
We briefly recall the syntax and semantics of CL, and refer to [32] for further details.
5See [15] for the definition of ATL∗i,R, where subscript i refers to “imperfect information” and subscript R to “perfect recall”.
Also, we consider the so-called objective semantics for ATL∗i,R.
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Notation for trees. Note that our definition for trees (see Section 3.2) differs slightly from the
one in [32], where the root is the empty word. Here we adopt this convention to stay closer to
notations in [32]. Thus, (Y ,X )-trees in CL are of the form (τ , l) where τ ⊆ X ∗ and l : τ → 2Y .
For two disjoint sets X and Y , we identify 2X × 2Y with 2X∪Y . Let X and Y be two sets with
Z = X ∪ Y , and let M and N be two disjoint sets. Given an M-labelled 2Z -tree t = (τ , ℓM ) and an
N -labelled 2Z -tree t ′ = (τ ′, ℓN ) with same domain τ = τ ′, we define t ⊎ t ′ := (τ , ℓ′), where for
every u ∈ τ , ℓ′(u) = ℓM (u) ∪ ℓN (u). Now, given a completeM-labelled 2X -tree t = ((2X )∗, ℓM ) and
a complete N -labelled 2Y -tree t ′ = ((2Y )∗, ℓN ), we define t ⊕ t ′ := t ↑2
Z \X
⊎ t ′↑2
Z \Y
.
CL Syntax. Let C be a set of coordination variables, and let S be a set of strategy variables disjoint
from C. The syntax of CL is given by the following grammar:
φ ::= x | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | Xφ | φUφ | `C∃s .φ
where x ∈ C ∪ S, C ⊆ C and s ∈ S, and with the restriction that each coordination variable
appears in at most one subtree quantifier `C∃s . , and similarly for strategy variables.
The notion of free and bound (coordination or strategy) variables is as usual. The set of free
coordination variables in φ is noted Fφ . A bound coordination variable c is visible to a strategy
variable s if s is in the scope of the quantifier that introduces c , and Scopeφ (s) is the union of the
set of bound coordination variables visible to s and the set of free coordination variables (note that
this union is disjoint). We will see, in the semantics, that the meaning of a bound strategy variable
s is a strategy fs : (2
Scopeφ (s))∗ → 2{s }. Free strategy variables are called atomic propositions, and
we denote the set of atomic propositions in φ by APφ .
CL Semantics.ACL formulaφ is evaluated on a complete APφ -labelled 2Fφ -tree t . An (APφ , 2Fφ )-
tree t = (τ , ℓ) satisfies a CL formula φ if for every path λ that starts in the root we have t , λ, 0 |= φ,
where the satisfaction of a formula at position i ≥ 0 of a path λ is defined inductively as follows:
t , λ, i |=p if p ∈ ℓ(λi )
t , λ, i |=¬φ ′ if t , λ, i 6 |= φ ′
t , λ, i |=φ1 ∨ φ2 if t , λ, i |= φ1 or t , λ, i |= φ2
t , λ, i |=Xφ ′ if t , λ, i + 1 |= φ ′
t , λ, i |=φ1Uφ2 if ∃ j ≥ i s.t. t , λ, j |= φ2 and ∀k s.t. i ≤ k < j, t , λ,k |= φ1
t , λ, i |=`C∃s .φ ′ if ∃ f : (2Scopeφ (s))∗ → 2{s } s.t. tλi ⊕ ((2
Scopeφ (s))∗, f ) |= φ ′,
where tλi is the subtree of t rooted in λi .
First, observe that in the last inductive case, tλi being a 2
Fφ -tree, tλi ⊕ ((2
Scopeφ (s))∗, f ) is a
2Fφ∪Scopeφ (s)-tree. By definition, Scopeφ (s) = Fφ ∪ C = Fφ′ . It follows that Fφ ∪ Scopeφ (s) =
Scopeφ (s) = Fφ′ , hence φ
′ is indeed evaluated on a Fφ′-tree.
Remark 5. Note that all strategies observe the value of all atomic propositions. Formally, for every
CL-formula φ of the form φ = `C1∃s1. . . . , `Ci∃si .φ ′ evaluated on a 2Fφ -tree t = (τ , ℓ), φ ′ is
evaluated on a 2Fφ∪C1∪...∪Ci -tree t ′ = (τ ′, ℓ′) such that for every p ∈ APφ , for every pair of nodes
u,u ′ ∈ t ′ such that u ↓2Fφ = u
′ ↓2Fφ , it holds that p ∈ ℓ
′(u) iff p ∈ ℓ′(u ′). Thus, in CL one cannot
directly capture strategic problems where atomic propositions are not observable to all players.
The input to the model-checking problem for CL consists of a CL formula φ and a finite repre-
sentation of a (APφ , 2Fφ )-tree t . The standard assumption is to assume t is a regular tree, i.e., is
the unfolding of a finite structure. Precisely, a finite representation of a (APφ , 2Fφ )-tree t = (τ , ℓ′)
is a structure S = (S,R, ℓ, sι) such that
• S = 2Fφ ,
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• R = S × S ,
• ℓ : S → 2APφ ,
• sι ∈ S ,
and t = tS is the unfolding of S.
Thus, an instance of the model-checking problem for CL is a pair (S,Φ) where S = (S,R, sι , ℓ)
is a finite representation of an (APφ , 2Fφ )-tree and Φ is a CL formula (over variables S ∪ C). The
model-checking problem for CL is the following decision problem: given an instance (S,Φ), return
‘Yes’ if tS |= Φ and ‘No’ otherwise.
We now describe a natural translation of CL-instances to SLii-instances. This translation:
(1) reduces the model-checking problem of CL to that of the hierarchical fragment of SLii.
(2) shows that CL only produces instances in which all atoms are uniform with regard to all
observations, i.e., instances (G,Φ) such that for every p ∈ AP and o ∈ Obs, v ∼o v ′ implies
p ∈ ℓ(v) ↔ p ∈ ℓ(v ′).
We will present the translation in two steps: first fromCL-instances intoQCTL∗i,⊆-instances, and
then fromQCTL∗ii-instances to SLii-instances such thatQCTL
∗
i,⊆-instances translate to hierarchical
SLii-instances.
6.2.1 Translating CL toQCTL∗i,⊆. Let (S,Φ) be an instance of the model-checking problem for CL,
where S = (S,R, ℓ, sι). We will construct a QCTL∗i,⊆-instance (S˜, φ˜) such that S |= Φ iff S˜ |= Φ˜. Let
A˜P be the set of all strategy variables occurring in Φ, let C(Φ) be the set of coordination variables
that appear in Φ, and assume, w.l.o.g., that C(φ) = [n] for some n ∈ N. Let hidden(Φ) := C(Φ) \ Fφ .
First, we define the CKS S˜ over A˜P: the idea is to add in the structure S the local states corre-
sponding to coordination variables that are not seen by all the strategies.
Formally, S˜ := (S˜, R˜, s˜ι , ℓ˜) where
• S˜ =
∏
c ∈C(Φ) Lc where Lc = {c0, c1},
• R˜ = S˜ × S˜ ,
• for every s ∈ S˜ , ℓ˜(s) = ℓ(s ↓Fφ ), and
• s˜ι ∈ S˜ is any state s such that s ↓Fφ= sι
Second, we define concrete observations corresponding to strategy variables in Φ. As explained
in [32], and as reflected in the semantics of CL, the intuition is that a strategy variable s in formula
Φ observes coordination variables Scopeφ (s). Therefore, we simply define, for each strategy variable
s in Φ, the concrete observation os := Scopeφ (s).
Finally, we define the QCTL∗ii formula Φ˜. This is done by induction on Φ as follows (recall that
we take for atomic propositions in QCTL∗ii the set of all strategy variables in Φ):
x˜ := x
¬˜φ := ¬φ˜φ1 ∨ φ2 := φ˜1 ∨ φ˜2
X˜φ := X φ˜φ1Uφ2 := φ˜1 U φ˜2`C∃s .φ := ∃os s .Aφ˜
In the last case, note that C ⊆ os = Scopeφ (s).
Note that Φ˜ is a hierarchicalQCTL∗ii-formula. Also, one can easily check that the following holds:
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Lemma 6.4. tS |= Φ iff t S˜ |= AΦ˜.
Importantly, we notice that AΦ˜ ∈ QCTL∗i,⊆ , and that:
Lemma 6.5. For every x ∈ APφ and every s quantified in Φ, t S˜ is os -uniform in x .
6.2.2 Translation from QCTL∗ii to SLii. We now present a translation of QCTL
∗
ii-instances to SLii-
instances. It is a simple adaptation of the reduction from the model-checking problem for QCTL∗
to the model-checking problem for ATL∗sc presented in [54].
Let (S,Φ) be an instance of the model-checking problem for QCTL∗ii, where S = (S,R, ℓ, sι) and
S ⊆
∏
i ∈[n] Li . We assume, without loss of generality, that every atomic proposition is quantified at
most once, and that if it appears quantified it does not appear free. Also, let AP∃(Φ) = {p1, . . . ,pk }
be the set of atomic propositions quantified in Φ, and for i ∈ [k], let oi be the concrete observation
associated to the quantifier on pi .
We build the CGSii GS := (Ac,V , E, ℓ′,vι ,O) over agents Ag := {a0,a1, . . . ,ak }, observations
Obs := {o0,o1, . . . ,ok } and atomic propositions AP := AP∃(Φ) ∪ {pS }, where pS is a fresh atomic
proposition. Intuitively, agent a0 is in charge of choosing transitions in S, while agent ai for i ≥ 1
is in charge of choosing the valuation for pi ∈ AP∃(Φ).
To this aim, we let
V :=
{vs | s ∈ S} ∪
{vs,i | s ∈ S and i ∈ [k]} ∪
{vpi | 0 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪
{v⊥}
and
Ac := {cs | s ∈ S} ∪ {ci | 0 ≤ i ≤ k}.
In positions of the form vs with s ∈ S , transitions are determined by the action of agent a0. First,
she can choose to simulate a transition in S: for every joint action c ∈ AcAg such that c0 = cs
′
,
E(vs ,c) :=
{
vs ′ if R(s, s ′)
v⊥ otherwise.
She can also choose to move to a position in which agent ai will choose the valuation for pi in the
current node: for every joint action c ∈ AcAg such that c0 = ci ,
E(vs ,c) :=
{
vs,i if i , 0
v⊥ otherwise.
Next, in a position of the formvs,i , agent ai determines the transition, which codes the labelling
of pi in the current node: choosing ci means that pi holds in the current node, choosing any other
action codes that pi does not hold. Formally, for every joint action c ∈ AcAg,
E(vs,i ,c) :=
{
vpi if ci = c
i
v⊥ otherwise.
Positions of the form vpi and v⊥ are sink positions.
The labelling function ℓ′ is defined as follows:
ℓ
′(v) :=

ℓ(s) ∪ {pS } if v = vs for some s ∈ S
∅ if v ∈ {vs,i | s ∈ S, i ∈ [k]} ∪ {vp0 ,v⊥}
{pi } if v = vpi with i ∈ [k]
ACM Trans. Comput. Logic, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: March 2020.
36 R. Berthon, B. Maubert, A. Murano, S. Rubin and M. Y. Vardi
Finally we let vι := vsι and we define the observation interpretation as follows:
O(o0) := {(v,v) | v ∈ V },
meaning that agent a0 has perfect information, and for i ∈ [k], O(oi ) is the smallest reflexive
relation such that
O(oi ) ⊇
⋃
s,s ′∈S
{(vs ,vs ′), (vs,i ,vs ′,i ) | s ≈oi s
′}.
We explain the latter definition. First, observe that for every finite play ρ in GS that stays in
VS = {vs | s ∈ S}, writing ρ = vs0 . . .vsn , one can associate a finite path λρ = s0 . . . sn in S. This
mapping actually defines a bijection between the set of finite paths in S that start in sι and the set
of finite plays in GS that remain in VS .
Now, according to the definition of the transition function, a strategy σi for agent i with i ∈ [k]
is only relevant on finite plays of the form ρ = ρ ′ · vs,i , where ρ ′ ∈ V ∗S , and σi (ρ) is meant to
determine whether pi holds in λρ ′. If σi is oi -uniform, by definition of O(oi ), it determines an
oi -uniform labelling for pi in tS . Reciprocally, an oi -uniform labelling for pi in tS induces an
O(oi )-strategy for agent ai . It remains to transform Φ into an SLii-formula.
We define the SLii formula Φ˜ by induction on Φ as follows:
p˜ :=
{
EXXp if p = pi
p otherwise
¬˜φ := ¬φ˜φ1 ∨ φ2 := φ˜1 ∨ φ˜2
E˜ψ := E(GpS ∧ ψ˜ )∃oipi .φ := 〈〈xi 〉〉oi (ai , xi )φ˜.
The cases for path formulas are obtained by distributing over the operators.
Observe that player 0 is never bound to a strategy. In the case for atomic propositions, the
existential quantification on outcomes thus lets player 0 choose to move to a position where agent
i fixes the value for pi according to his strategy, fixed by the strategy quantifier in the translation
for formulas of the form ∃oipi .φ. In the translation of formulas of the form Eψ , the existential
quantification on outcomes lets player 0 choose a path in the original CKS S.
We have the following:
Lemma 6.6. S |= Φ if and only if GS |= Φ˜.
We observe that if Φ is hierarchical, then (Φ˜,GS) is a hierarchical instance, and:
Lemma 6.7. For every p ∈ APf (Φ) and for every i ∈ [k], if tS is oi -uniform in p then v ∼oi v
′
implies that p ∈ ℓ(v) iff p ∈ ℓ(v ′).
Combining Lemma 6.4 with Lemma 6.6 we get a reduction from the model-checking problem
for CL to that for the hierarchical fragment of SLii, and Lemma 6.5 together with Lemma 6.7 show
that in the models produced by this reduction, all atomic propositions are observable to all players.
This implies that in CL one cannot reason about strategic problems with unobservable objectives.
As a result it does not fully capture classic distributed synthesis [50, 69], where the specification
can talk about all variables, hidden and visible. It also shows that CL does not capture in a natural
way ATL with imperfect information as defined in [1, Section 7.1], where imperfect information
of agents is modelled by defining which atomic propositions they can observe. This, as well as
unobservable objectives, can be naturally modelled in SLii.
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7 APPLICATIONS
In this section we apply Theorem 2.9 to decide the existence of Nash Equilibria in hierarchical
games of imperfect information. We then use a similar approach to obtain decidability results for
the rational synthesis problem. In this section, for a tuple of agents a = (ai )i ∈[m] and tuple of
strategy variables x = (xi )i ∈[m], we let (a,x) be a macro for (a1, x1) . . . (am, xm), and similarly for
the unbinding operator (a, ?) which stands for (a1, ?) . . . (am , ?).
7.1 Existence of Nash Equilibria in games with hierarchical observations
ANash equilibrium in a game is a tuple of strategies such that no player has an incentive to deviate.
Let Ag = {ai : i ∈ [n]}. Assuming that agent ai has observation oi and LTL goalψi , the following
SLii formula expresses the existence of a Nash equilibrium:
ΦNE :=〈〈x1〉〉
o1 . . . 〈〈xn〉〉
on (a,x)
∧
i ∈[n]
[ (
〈〈yi 〉〉
oi (ai ,yi )Aψi
)
→ Aψi
]
where a = (ai )i ∈[n] and x = (xi )i ∈[n].
Nash equilibria do not always exist when one restricts attention to pure strategies, as we do in
this work. This is the case already in finite games, and by extension also in the infinite concur-
rent games played on graphs that we consider. This motivates the study of the Nash equilibria
existence problem in such games. In the perfect information case, the problem has been solved for
ω-regular objectives, as well as more complex semi-quantitative objectives [12]. When moving to
imperfect information, for two players the problem is decidable for LTL objectives [38] and parity
objectives [30]. However, as for distributed synthesis, existence of Nash equilibria becomes un-
decidable for more than two players. This result is proved in [11] for constrained Nash equilibria
(when one specifies for each player whether her objective is satisfied or not), and in [38] for uncon-
strained equilibria. In both cases the proof proceeds by reduction from the distributed synthesis
problem [63, 69].
The only known decidable cases for more than two players assume that all players receive the
same information. In [11] the problem is solved on games where players observe the evolution of
the game via public signals and objectives are given by visible parity conditions or mean-payoff
functions. In [4], an epistemic extension of strategy logic is used to solve the existence of Nash
equilibria on games with broadcast actions for objectives given as formulas from epistemic tempo-
ral logic. A stronger notion of Nash equilibria, called locally consistent equilibria, is studied in [72].
In a locally consistent equilibrium, each player’s strategy has to be a best response not only to
other players’ strategies in the equilibrium, but also to all strategies that are indistinguishable
from those in the equilibrium. It is proved in [72] that the existence of such equilibria is decidable
on a model of games close in spirit to those with public signals studied in [11].
Here we show that the existence of Nash equilibria is decidable for n players when observations
are hierarchical and objectives are given as LTL formulas. Note that this result is orthogonal to
those described above, which all allow in a way or another some non-hierarchical information:
in [11] players know their own actions in addition to the public signals, in [72] they know their
private local state, and in [4] they can have incomparable initial knowledge of the situation.
Definition 7.1. A CGSii G presents hierarchical observation [8] if the “finer-than” relation is a
total ordering, i.e., if for all o,o′ ∈ Obs, either O(o) ⊆ O(o′) or O(o′) ⊆ O(o).
Let G be a CGSii with hierarchical observation, and since all agents have symmetric roles in the
problem considered, assume without loss of generality that O(on) ⊆ . . . ⊆ O(o1).
Because of the nested strategy quantifiers 〈〈yi 〉〉oi , the instance (G,ΦNE) is not hierarchical even
if G yields hierarchical observation (unless O(oi ) = O(oj ) for all i, j ∈ [n]). However, considering
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the special observation symbol op that is always interpreted as the identity relation (and thus
represents perfect observation), and letting
Φ
′ :=〈〈x1〉〉
o1 . . . 〈〈xn〉〉
on (a,x)
∧
i ∈[n]
[(
〈〈yi 〉〉
op (ai ,yi ) Eψi
)
→ Eψi
]
,
we have thatΦ′ forms a hierarchical instance with anyCGSii that presents hierarchical observation.
Besides, we can prove that for deterministic strategies, Φ′ is equivalent to ΦNE:
Lemma 7.2. If we consider deterministic strategies, then ΦNE ≡ Φ
′.
Proof. Concerning the universal versus existential quantification on outcomes, it is enough to
observe that assigning a deterministic strategy to each agent determines a unique outcome. Next,
to change each inner oi for op , we exploit the fact that in a one-player game of partial observation
(such a game occurs when all but one player have fixed their strategies), the player has a strategy
enforcing some goal iff she has a uniform strategy enforcing that goal.
To see this, it is enough to establish that for every CGSii G and position v ,
G, χ ,v |= 〈〈yi 〉〉
op (ai ,yi ) Eψi ↔ 〈〈yi 〉〉
oi (ai ,yi ) Eψi ,
for every i ∈ [n] and every assignment χ such that χ(aj ) is defined for all j .
To this end, fix i and χ . The right-to-left implication is immediate (since op is finer than oi ). For
the converse, let σ be an op -strategy (i.e., a perfect-information strategy) such that G′, χ ′,vι |= ψi ,
where χ ′ = χ[yi 7→ σ ,ai 7→ σ ]. Because we consider deterministic strategies and χ ′ assigns a
strategy to each agent, it defines a unique outcome π from the initial position, i.e., Out(χ ′,vι) =
{π }. We construct an oi -strategy σ ′ such that if ai uses it instead of σ , we obtain the same outcome
π , i.e., Out(χ ′′,vι) = {π }, where χ ′′ = χ[yi 7→ σ ′,ai 7→ σ ′]. This can be done as follows: if
ρ ∼oi π≤ |ρ |−1 then define σ
′(ρ) := σ (π≤ |ρ |−1), and otherwise let σ
′(ρ) := c for some fixed action
c ∈ Ac. It is easy to see that σ ′ is an oi -strategy and that χ ′′ produces the same outcome as χ from
vι . 
Corollary 7.3. If we consider deterministic strategies, then the existence of Nash Equilibria in
games with hierarchical observation and k different observations is in (k + 1)-Exptime.
Proof. Deciding the existence of a Nash Equilibrium in a CGSii G amounts to model-checking
formula ΦNE in G, which by Lemma 7.2 is equivalent to model-checking Φ′ in G if we restrict to
deterministic strategies. BecauseΦ′ forms hierarchical instances with games that yield hierarchical
observation, by Theorem 2.9 we can model check it on such games. Now because eachψi is an LTL
formula, we have that
sd (〈〈yi 〉〉
op (ai ,yi ) Eψi ) = (0, nd),
sd
©­«
∧
i ∈[n]
[(
〈〈yi 〉〉
op (ai ,yi ) Eψi
)
→ Eψi
]ª®¬ = (0, alt),
and finally we obtain that sd(Φ′) = (k, nd), where k is the number of different observations in G,
i.e., k = |{O(o1), . . . ,O(on)}|. By Proposition 5.2, we can model check Φ′ on G in time (k + 1)-
exponential, which concludes. 
We now show that, using the same trick, our main result can be applied to solve a more general
problem called rational synthesis.
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7.2 Rational distributed synthesis in games with hierarchical observations
In classic synthesis, the environment is considered monolithic and “hostile”, in the sense that the
system to be synthesised should be able to deal with all possible behaviours of the environment,
even the most undesirable ones. This is a very strong requirement that can not always be met.
When the environment can be considered rational, and its objective is known, it is reasonable to
relax this requirement by asking that the system to synthesise behave well against the rational
behaviours of the environment. This problem is known as the rational synthesis problem [23, 30,
33, 48]. In the setting considered in the works above-mentioned, the system is seen as an agent a
and the environment is composed of several components, say {e1, . . . , em}, that are assumed to be
rational and follow individual objectives. While [23] and [30] consider various types of objectives
such as reachability, safety or parity, here we consider LTL objectives as is done in [33, 48]: the
specification for the system is an LTL formula ψд , and the objective of each component ei of the
environment is an LTL formulaψi . However note that the decidability results we establish would
also hold for arbitrary omega-regular objectives.
7.2.1 Rational synthesis: state of the art. Two variants of the rational synthesis problem have been
considered: the cooperative one, in which it is possible to tell the environment how to behave, as
long as the suggested behaviour for each component forms an equilibrium, and the non-cooperative
one, in which the components of the environment may have any behaviour that forms an equilib-
rium. The existence of a solution to these problems can be expressed by the formulas Φc-RS and
Φnc-RS, respectively, defined as follows:
Φc-RS := 〈〈x〉〉
op 〈〈y1〉〉
op . . . 〈〈ym〉〉
op (a, x)(e,y)φγ ∧ Aψд
Φnc-RS := 〈〈x〉〉
op [[y1]]
op . . . [[ym]]
op (a, x)(e,y)φγ → Aψд
where e = (ei )i ∈[m], y = (yi )i ∈[m], and φγ expresses that y forms an equilibrium for the environ-
ment. Also, as in the previous section, op represents the perfect-information observation. Three
different kinds of equilibria are considered in [48]: profiles of dominant strategies, Nash equilib-
ria, and subgame-perfect equilibria. Here we only consider Nash equilibria, because subgames of
games with imperfect information should start in situations where all players have perfect infor-
mation of the state, which we do not know how to express in SLii; and for dominant strategies, the
natural formula to express them does not give rise to non-trivial decidable cases in the imperfect-
information setting that we introduce later. The rational synthesis problem for Nash equilibria is
obtained by replacing φγ in the above formula with:
φNE :=
∧
i ∈[m]
[(
〈〈y′i 〉〉
op (ei ,y
′
i )Aψi
)
→ Aψi
]
It is proved in [48] that these problems are decidable for perfect information. Concerning im-
perfect information, because the existence of Nash equilibria is undecidable for three players, the
problem is undecidable when the environment consists of at least three components [30]. Three
decidable cases are known: when the environment consists of a single component [30], when ac-
tions of all components are public [4], and when only the system has imperfect information while
the (finitely many) components of the environment are perfectly informed [30].
We now extend the latter result by defining a generalisation of the rational synthesis problem
that we call rational distributed synthesis, and solving it in the case of hierarchical information. The
case where the environment is perfectly informed and the system consists of a single component,
solved in [30], is a particular case of our Corollary 7.5 below6. However the other decidability
6We only consider LTL objectives, but our automata construction can be adapted to handle all ω-regular objectives.
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result established in [30] does not assume hierarchical information, and thus cannot be derived
from the results we now present.
7.2.2 Rational distributed synthesis. While for perfect information, distributed synthesis amounts
to synthesis for a single meta-component which tells each component what to do, in the context
of imperfect information it makes sense to consider that the system to be synthesised is composed
of various components {a1, . . . ,an} with different observation power, say oi for component ai . We
also let oei be the observation of the environment’s component ei , for i ∈ [m].
We consider the imperfect-information variants of cooperative and non-cooperative rational
synthesis defined by the following SLii formulas:
Φ
ii
c-RS := 〈〈x1〉〉
o1 . . . 〈〈xn〉〉
on 〈〈y1〉〉
oe1 . . . 〈〈ym〉〉
oem (a,x)(e,y)φγ ∧ Aψд
Φ
ii
nc-RS := 〈〈x〉〉
o1 . . . 〈〈xn〉〉
on [[y1]]
oe1 . . . [[ym]]
oem (a,x)(e,y)φγ → Aψд
The formula for Nash equilibrium is adapted as follows:
φiiNE :=
∧
i ∈[m]
[ (
〈〈y′i 〉〉
oei (ei ,y
′
i )Aψi
)
→ Aψi
]
The only difference with the perfect-information case is that we use the observation of the
different components of the environment instead of the perfect-information observation.
We call the problems expressed by formulasΦiic-RS and Φ
ii
nc-RS cooperative rational distributed syn-
thesis and non-cooperative rational distributed synthesis, respectively. As in the previous section on
the existence of Nash equilibria, one can see that even if there is a total hierarchy on all obser-
vations, these formula do not yield hierarchical instances unless all observations are the same.
However, the trick applied in the proof of Corollary 7.3 also applies here, both for Nash equilib-
ria and subgame-perfect equilibria, i.e., we can replace each oei with op in φ
ii
NE without affecting
the semantics of formulas Φiic-RS and Φ
ii
nc-RS. As a result, when there is a hierarchy on observations
o1, . . . ,on ,o
e
1 , . . . ,o
e
m , the cooperative rational distributed synthesis is decidable.
Corollary 7.4. If we consider deterministic strategies and hierarchical observations, then cooper-
ative rational distributed synthesis is decidable.
For the non-cooperative variant, one cannot switch universal quantifications on strategies for
the environments with existential quantifications for the system in order to obtain hierarchical
instances, as the resulting formula would then capture a different problem. As a consequence, in
addition to a hierarchy on observations o1, . . . ,on,oe1 , . . . ,o
e
m , we need to have that the components
of the environment observe better than the components of the system or, in other words, that the
least informed component of the environment observes better than the best informed component
of the system. When it is the case, we say that the environment is more informed than the system.
Corollary 7.5. Non-cooperative rational distributed synthesis is decidable for deterministic strate-
gies and hierarchical observations where the environment is more informed than the system.
This result applies for instance when there is hierarchical information amongst the components
of the system, and the environment has perfect information. Note that when the system consists
of a single component, this corresponds to the second decidability result in [30]. As we mentioned
in the introduction, considering that the opponent has perfect information is something classic
in two-player games with imperfect information, as doing so ensures that the strategy one syn-
thesises is winning no matter how much the opponent observes. In Reif’s words, this amounts to
considering the possibility that the opponent may “cheat” and use information that it normally
does not have access to [73]. The non-cooperative rational synthesis problem is not precisely a
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two-player game, but it resembles one in the sense that the system as a whole (composed of its
various components a1, . . . ,an ) should win against any “rational” behaviour of the environment
as a whole. In this view, considering that the components of the environment have perfect infor-
mation thus yields a distributed system that is robust to possible leaks of hidden information to
the environment.
Remark 6. When all components of the environment have perfect information, Φiic-RS and Φ
ii
nc-RS
already form hierarchical instances with games where there is hierarchical observation amongst
the system’s components, and one does not need to resort to the trick used in the proof of Corol-
lary 7.3. A consequence is that in that case, corollaries 7.4 and 7.5 also hold for nondeterministic
strategies.
8 CONCLUSION
We introduced SLii, a logic for reasoning about strategic behaviour in multi-player games with
imperfect information. The syntax specifies the observations with which strategies have to work,
and thus allows one to reason about strategic problems in settings where agents can change obser-
vation power, for instance by being eventually granted access to previously hidden information.
Moreover our logic contains an outcome quantifier and an unbinding operator which simplify the
semantics, make it easier to express branching-time properties, allow us to naturally consider non-
deterministic strategies, and make the correspondence with QCTL∗ii tighter, enabling us to derive
precise complexity results for the model-checking of SLii.
We isolated the class of hierarchical formula/model pairs (Φ,G) and proved that for such in-
stances one can decide whether G |= Φ. The proof reduces (hierarchical) instances of SLii to (hi-
erarchical) formulas of QCTL∗ii, a low-level logic that we introduced, and that serves as a natural
bridge between SLii and automata constructions. We also studied in detail the complexity of the
model-checking problems solved in this work. To do so we introduced a new measure on formulas
called simulation depth. This measure, though being a purely syntactic notion, reflects the com-
plexity of automata constructions required to treat a given formula.
Since one can alternate quantifiers in SLii, our decidability result goes beyond synthesis and can
be used to easily obtain the decidability of many strategic problems. In this work we applied it
to the problem of existence of Nash equilibria in games with hierarchical observation, and to the
imperfect-information generalisations of rational synthesis that we called (cooperative and non-
cooperative) rational distributed synthesis. Our result has also been used to prove that the existence
of admissible strategies in games with hierarchical information is decidable [14].
An interesting direction for future work would be to try and adapt the notion of hierarchical
instances to allow for situations in which hierarchies can change along a play, as done in [8]. We
would also like to consider alternatives to the synchronous perfect recall setting considered here,
such as the classic asynchronous perfect recall setting [29, 70], or the more recent notion of causal
knowledge [36]. Finally, it is often interesting in presence of imperfect information to introduce
epistemic operators to reason explicitely aboutwhat agents know.We already generalised themain
result of this work to an extension of SLii with such operators [59]; we would like to see if this can
be used to reason about subgame-perfect equilibria in games with imperfect information, which
do not seem to be easy to characterise in SLii, as mentioned in Section 7.2.1. Indeed, in games with
imperfect information, the notion of subgame specifies that the initial situation should be known
to all players [76], a property that epistemic logics are meant to be able to express.
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A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.12
First, for every LTL formulaψ one can build a parity word automatonWψ with two colours and
2O ( |ψ |) states [81]. Let Kψ ∈ N be such that the number of states ofWψ is bounded by 2
Kψ |ψ | .
We also state a more precise version of Theorem 4.6: for every ATA A with n states and l
colours, one can build an NTA N with at most 2O (nl log(nl )) states and O(nl) colours such that
L(A) = L(N) [57, 61]. We let K1,K2 ∈ N be such that the number of states of N is bounded by
2K1nl log(nl ) and the number of colours by K2nl .
Proposition 4.12 follows directly from the following.
Proposition A.1. Let Φ be a QCTL∗i,⊆ formula, S a CKS, and let AP∃ = AP∃(Φ). For every sub-
formula φ of Φ and state s ∈ S, it holds that:
• if sdk (φ) = 0,A
φ
s has at most f
φ
S
states and 2 colours,
• if sdk (φ) ≥ 1, A
φ
s has at most exp
(
sdk (φ) | f
φ
S
log f φ
S
)
states, and its number of colours is at
most exp
(
sdk (φ) − 1 | f
φ
S
log f φ
S
)
,
with f
φ
S
= (4K1 + 2K2)∃d(φ) |φ | |S|Ed(φ)2Kψ |φ |Ed(φ) .
In addition, ifA
φ
s has state setQ , for each q ∈ Q and a ∈ 2
AP∃ , we have |δ (q,a)| ≤ |S||Q | |S |2H |φ | ,
where H = 1 + Ed(φ).
Proof. We prove the result by induction on φ.
φ = p : in this case sdk (φ) = ∃d(φ) = Ed(φ) = 0. By construction, A
φ
s has one state qι and two
colours, so that the first part of the claim holds. In addition, each formula of its transition function
is of size one, so that the second part of the claim also holds.
φ = ¬φ ′ : Complementing an ATA does not change the number of states, number of colours or
size of formulas in the transition function, so that the result follows by induction hypothesis and
the fact that |φ ′ | ≤ |φ | and Ed(φ) = Ed(φ ′).
φ = φ1 ∨φ2 : To establish the claim about number of states and colours we split cases. First we
consider the case where sdk (φ) = 0. In that case we also have sdk (φ1) = sdk (φ2) = 0. By induction
hypothesis, for i ∈ {1, 2}, A
φi
s has at most f
φi
S
states and 2 colours. These automata are then
narrowed down, but the narrowing operation leaves the size of formulas in the transition function
unchanged (in fact they may become smaller, but not bigger, see [49]). Therefore, by construction
A
φ
s has at most 1 + f
φ1
S
+ f
φ2
S
states and two colours.
Now we have that
1 + f
φ1
S
+ f
φ2
S
= 1 +
∑
i ∈{1,2}
(4K1 + 2K2)
∃d(φi ) |φi | |S|
Ed(φi )2Kψ |φi |Ed(φi )
= 1 + (4K1 + 2K2)
∃d(φ) |φ | |S|Ed(φ)
∑
i ∈{1,2}
2Kψ |φi |Ed(φ)
≤ 1 + (4K1 + 2K2)
∃d(φ) |φ | |S|Ed(φ)2Kψ ( |φ1 |+ |φ2 |)Ed(φ)
1 + f φ1
S
+ f
φ2
S
≤ (4K1 + 2K2)
∃d(φ) |φ | |S|Ed(φ)2Kψ ( |φ1 |+ |φ2 |+1)Ed(φ)
We get that
1 + f φ1
S
+ f
φ2
S
≤ f
φ
S
(8)
which concludes the claim about the number of states.
Now for the case where sdk (φ) ≥ 1. By definition of nondeterminisation depth, for at least one
i ∈ {1, 2} we have sdk (φi ) ≥ 1. Also, the number of colours used in A
φ
s is the maximum between
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the number of colours used in A
φ1
s and those used in A
φ2
s . By induction hypothesis it is the case
that Aφis has at most exp
(
sdk (φi ) − 1 | f
φi
S
log f φi
S
)
colours if sdk (φi ) ≥ 1, or 2 if sdk (φi ) = 0.
Therefore, the number of colours inAφs is at most exp
(
sdk (φi ) − 1 | f
φi
S
log f φi
S
)
for some i , which
is less than exp
(
sdk (φ) − 1 | f
φ
S
log f
φ
S
)
.
For the number of states |Q | in A
φ
s , we have that |Q | = 1 + |Q1 | + |Q2 |, where Qi is the set of
states ofAφis . By induction hypothesis we get
|Q | ≤ 1 +
∑
i ∈{1,2}
exp
(
sdk (φi ) | f
φi
S
log f φi
S
)
≤ 1 + exp
(
sdk (φ) |
∑
i ∈{1,2}
f
φi
S
log f
φi
S
)
≤ exp
(
sdk (φ) | (
∑
i ∈{1,2}
f
φi
S
+ 1) log f
φ
S
)
|Q | ≤ exp
(
sdk (φ) | f
φ
S
log f φ
S
)
(using Equation (8))
which concludes the claim about the number of states.
Concerning the size of formulas in the transition function, for all states from A
φ1
s and A
φ2
s
the transition function is unchanged and the result thus holds by induction hypothesis. For the
remaining state qι , we have by definition δ (qι ,a) = δ 1(q1ι ,a) ∨ δ
2(q2ι ,a) and thus |δ (qι ,a)| =
|δ 1(q1ι ,a)| + |δ
2(q2ι ,a)| + 1. By induction hypothesis we get that
|δ (qι ,a)| ≤ |S||Q1 |
|S |2H (φ1) |φ1 | + |S||Q2 |
|S |2H (φ2) |φ2 | + 1
≤ |S|2H (φ)( |φ1 |+ |φ2 |)(|Q1 |
|S |
+ |Q2 |
|S |)
≤ |S|2H (φ) |φ | (|Q1 | + |Q2 |)
|S |
And thus |δ (qι ,a)| ≤ |S|2H (φ) |φ | |Q | |S | as required.
φ = Eψ : The word automaton built for the LTL skeleton ofψ is in fact a Büchi automaton, and
thus uses only two colours. The number of colours used byAφs is therefore the maximum number
of colours used by the automataA
φi
s built for the maximal state subformulasφi inψ , and the result
follows by induction hypothesis.
Concerning the number of states, let |Qφ | (resp. |Qi |, |Qψ |) be the number of states inA
φ
s (resp.
A
φi
s , W
ψ ). Note that the number of states in A
φi
s ′ does not depend on s
′. Recall that max(ψ ) =
{φ1, . . . ,φn} is the set of maximal state subformulas ofψ , and letψ ′ be the LTL skeleton ofψ , i.e.,
the LTL formula obtained fromψ by replacing maximal state subformulas φi with propositions pφi .
We thus have
|Q | = |Qψ | |S| + 2|S|
∑
i ∈[n]
|Qi |
≤ 2Kψ |ψ
′ | |S| + 2|S|
∑
i ∈[n]
exp
(
sdk (φi ) | f
φi
S
log f
φi
S
)
|Q | ≤ 2Kψ |ψ
′ | |S|
©­«1 + exp
(
sdk (φ) |
∑
i ∈[n]
f
φi
S
log f φi
S
)ª®¬
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And thus
|Q | ≤ 2Kψ |ψ
′ | |S|
©­«1 + exp
(
sdk (φ) | log f
φ
S
∑
i ∈[n]
f
φi
S
)ª®¬ (9)
Now observe that for each i ∈ [n]we have that Ed(φi ) ≤ Ed(φ) − 1, and ∃d(φi ) = ∃d(φ). Therefore,∑
i ∈[n]
f
φi
S
= (4K1 + 2K2)
∃d(φ)
∑
i ∈[n]
|φi | |S|
Ed(φi )2Kψ |φi |Ed(φi )
≤ (4K1 + 2K2)
∃d(φ) |S|Ed(φ)−1(
∑
i ∈[n]
|φi |)2
Kψ (Ed(φ)−1)
∑
i∈[n] |φi |
Using this in Equation (9) we get
|Q | ≤ 2Kψ |ψ
′ | |S|
©­«1 + exp
(
sdk (φ) | (4K1 + 2K2)
∃d(φ) |S|Ed(φ)−1(
∑
i ∈[n]
|φi |)2
Kψ (Ed(φ)−1)
∑
i∈[n] |φi | log f
φ
S
)ª®¬
≤ 2Kψ |ψ
′ | ©­«1 + exp
(
sdk (φ) | (4K1 + 2K2)
∃d(φ) |S|Ed(φ)(
∑
i ∈[n]
|φi |)2
Kψ (Ed(φ)−1)
∑
i∈[n] |φi | log f
φ
S
)ª®¬
≤ 2Kψ |ψ
′ |exp
(
sdk (φ) | (4K1 + 2K2)
∃d(φ) |S|Ed(φ)(1 +
∑
i ∈[n]
|φi |)2
Kψ (Ed(φ)−1)
∑
i∈[n] |φi | log f
φ
S
)
≤ exp
(
sdk (φ) | (4K1 + 2K2)
∃d(φ) |S|Ed(φ) |φ |2Kψ B log f
φ
S
)
,
where B = (Ed(φ) − 1)
∑
i ∈[n] |φi | + |ψ
′ |. To conclude it only remains to show that B ≤ |φ |Ed(φ).
Because φ = Eψ , it holds that Ed(φ) ≥ 1. If Ed(φ) = 1, we have B = |ψ ′ | ≤ |φ |Ed(φ). Now if
Ed(φ) ≥ 2, we have
B = (Ed(φ) − 2)
∑
i ∈[n]
|φi | + |ψ
′ | +
∑
i ∈[n]
|φi |
Clearly,
∑
i ∈[n] |φi | ≤ |φ |, and |ψ
′ | +
∑
i ∈[n] |φi | ≤ 2|φ |, and the result follows. Note that it could
seem that |ψ ′ | +
∑
i ∈[n] |φi | ≤ |φ |. It is true if one defines the size of a formula as the number of
connectors, but not if one also counts atomic propositions, as we do here. However it is true that
|ψ ′ | +
∑
i ∈[n] |φi | ≤ 2|φ |, independently of the definition of formulas’ size.
It remains to establish the claim about the size of transition formulas. By definition, for every
state q of Aφs that comes from some A
i
s ′ or A
i
s ′ , the transition function is unchanged and thus
the result follows by induction hypothesis and the fact that narrowing and complementation do
not increase the size of formulas in transition functions. Now for the remaining states, for each
(qψ , s ′) ∈ Q and every a ∈ 2AP∃(Φ), we have
|δ ((qψ , s ′),a)| ≤
∑
a′∈2max(ψ )
©­«|δψ ((qψ , s ′),a′)| + 1 +
∑
φi ∈a′
(|δ is ′(q
i
s ′,a)| + 1) +
∑
φi<a′
(|δ is ′(q
i
s ′,a)| + 1)
ª®¬
Now by induction hypothesis, and because complementation does not increase the size of formulas,
we get:
|δ ((qψ , s ′),a)| ≤
∑
a′∈2max(ψ )
©­«|δψ ((qψ , s ′),a′)| + 2
∑
i ∈[n]
|S|2H (φi ) |φi | |Qi |
|S |ª®¬+2 |max(ψ ) |+2|max(ψ )|2 |max(ψ ) |,
(10)
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where |Qi | is the number of states in automatonA
φi
s ′ . Now by definition,
|δψ ((q
ψ
, s ′),a′)| =
©­«
∑
q′∈∆ψ (qψ ,a′)
∑
s ′′∈R(s ′)
1
ª®¬ + |∆ψ (qψ ,a′)| |R(s ′)| − 1
|δψ ((q
ψ
, s ′),a′)| ≤ 2|∆ψ (qψ ,a′)| |R(s ′)| − 1
We thus have
|δψ ((q
ψ
, s ′),a′)| ≤ 2|Qψ ′ | |S| − 1 (11)
where Qψ ′ is the set of states of the word automatonWψ . Using this in Equation 10 we get:
|δ ((qψ , s ′),a)| ≤ 2 |max(ψ ) |
©­«2|Qψ ′ | |S| − 1 + 2
∑
i ∈[n]
|S|2H (φi ) |φi | |Qi |
|S |ª®¬ + 2 |max(ψ ) | + 2|max(ψ )|2 |max(ψ ) |
|δ ((qψ , s ′),a)| ≤ 2 |max(ψ ) |+1 |S|
©­«|Qψ ′ | +
∑
i ∈[n]
2H (φi ) |φi | |Qi |
|S |ª®¬ + 2|max(ψ )|2 |max(ψ ) |
But for natural numbers {ai ,bi }i ∈[n], it holds that∑
i ∈[n]
2aibi = 2
∑
i∈[n] ai
∑
i ∈[n]
bi −
∑
i ∈[n]
2ai (2
∑
j,i aj − 1)bi
Applying this to ai = H (φi )|φi | and bi = |Qi | |S | we obtain∑
i ∈[n]
2H (φi ) |φi | |Qi |
|S |
= 2
∑
i∈[n] H (φi ) |φi |
∑
i ∈[n]
|Qi |
|S | −
∑
i ∈[n]
2H (φi ) |φi |(2
∑
j,i H (φj ) |φj | − 1)|Qi |
|S |
We thus get that
|δ ((qψ , s ′),a)| ≤ 2 |max(ψ ) |+1 |S|
©­«|Qψ ′ | + 2
∑
i∈[n] H (φi ) |φi |
∑
i ∈[n]
|Qi |
|S |ª®¬ +C,
with
C = 2|max(ψ )|2 |max(ψ ) | − 2 |max(ψ ) |+1 |S|
∑
i ∈[n]
2H (φi ) |φi |(2
∑
j,i H (φj ) |φj | − 1)|Qi |
|S |
= 2 |max(ψ ) |
©­«2|max(ψ )| − 2|S|
∑
i ∈[n]
2H (φi ) |φi |(2
∑
j,i H (φj ) |φj | − 1)|Qi |
|S |ª®¬
If n = |max(ψ )| > 1, i.e., there are at least two maximal state subformulas, then
∑
j,i H (φ j )|φ j | > 0,
hence 2|S|
∑
i ∈[n] 2
H (φi ) |φi |(2
∑
j,i H (φj ) |φj | − 1)|Qi | |S | ≥ 4n = 4|max(ψ )|, which implies that C ≤ 0,
and thus
|δ ((qψ , s ′),a)| ≤ 2 |max(ψ ) |+1 |S|
©­«|Qψ ′ | + 2
∑
i∈[n] H (φi ) |φi |
∑
i ∈[n]
|Qi |
|S |ª®¬
≤ 2 |max(ψ ) |+1 |S|2
∑
i∈[n] H (φi ) |φi | ©­«|Qψ ′ | |S | +
∑
i ∈[n]
|Qi |
|S |ª®¬
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≤ |S|2 |max(ψ ) |+1+(H (φ)−1)
∑
i∈[n] |φi | ©­«|Qψ ′ | +
∑
i ∈[n]
|Qi |
ª®¬
|S |
≤ |S|2 |φ |+(H (φ)−1) |φ | |Q | |S |
|δ ((qψ , s ′),a)| ≤ |S|2H (φ) |φ | |Q | |S |
It remains to consider the case where max(ψ ) = {φ1}. In that case there are only two letters
in the alphabet 2max(ψ ), which are ∅ and {φ1}. The transition formulas then simplify and one gets
that
|δ ((qψ , s ′),a)| ≤ |δψ ((q
ψ
, s ′), ∅)| + 1 + |δ 1s ′(q
1
s ′,a)| + 1 + |δψ ((q
ψ
, s ′), {φ1})| + 1 + |δ
1
s ′(q
1
s ′,a)|
Using Equation (11) and the induction hypothesis we get
|δ ((qψ , s ′),a)| ≤ 4|Qψ ′ | |S| − 2 + 2|S|2
H (φ1) |φ1 | |Q1 |
|S |
+ 3
≤ 1 + 2|S|(2|Qψ ′ | + 2
H (φ1) |φ1 | |Q1 |
|S |)
≤ 1 + 2|S|2(H (φ)−1) |φ1 |(|Qψ ′ |
|S |
+ |Q1 |
|S | )
≤ 1 + |S|2H (φ) |φ | (|Qψ ′ |
|S |
+ |Q1 |
|S | )
|δ ((qψ , s ′),a)| ≤ |S|2H (φ) |φ | |Q | |S |
φ = ∃
o
p.φ ′ : We first establish the claim for states and colours, and we start with the case
sdk (φ) = sdk (φ ′). By definition we necessarily have that sdx (φ ′) = nd, i.e., A
φ′
s is nondetermin-
istic, and o = Iφ′ , therefore there is no need to use narrowing or nondeterminisation here. A
φ
s is
obtained by directly projecting A
φ′
s , an operation that does not change the number of states or
colours, so that the claim for states and colours follows directly by induction hypothesis.
Now we consider the case where sdk (φ) , sdk (φ ′), which implies that sdk (φ) ≥ 1. Let n be the
number of states and l the number of colours inAφ
′
s . In this caseA
φ′
s is first narrowed down, which
does not change number of states or colours. The resulting automaton is then nondeterminised,
yielding an automaton with at most 2K1nl lognl states and K2nl colours.
Again, we split cases: if sdk (φ ′) = 0, by induction hypothesis, n ≤ f
φ′
S
and l = 2. For the number
of colours, observing that ∃d(φ) = ∃d(φ ′) + 1, we have
K2nl ≤ 2K2 f
φ′
S
= 2K2(4K1 + 2K2)
∃d(φ′) |φ ′ | |S|Ed(φ
′)2Kψ |φ
′ |Ed(φ′)
≤ (4K1 + 2K2)
∃d(φ) |φ | |S|Ed(φ)2Kψ |φ |Ed(φ)
K2nl ≤ exp
(
sdk (φ) − 1 | f
φ
S
log f
φ
S
)
For the number of states, we have that
2K1nl lognl ≤ 22K1f
φ′
S
log(2f φ
′
S
) ≤ exp
(
sdkφ | f
φ
S
log(f
φ
S
)
)
Now for the final case, if sdk (φ) = sdk (φ ′) + 1 and sdk (φ ′) ≥ 1, by induction hypothesis n ≤
exp
(
sdk (φ ′) | f
φ′
S
log f
φ′
S
)
and l ≤ exp
(
sdk (φ ′) − 1 | f
φ′
S
log f
φ′
S
)
. For the number of colours inA
φ
s
we thus get
K2nl ≤ K2exp
(
sdk (φ
′) − 1 | f
φ′
S
log f
φ′
S
2f
φ′
S
log f φ
′
S
)
≤ exp
(
sdk (φ
′) | 2K2 f
φ′
S
log f
φ′
S
)
K2nl ≤ exp
(
sdk (φ) − 1 | f
φ
S
log f
φ
S
)
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Concerning the number of states, we observe that
nl ≤ exp
(
sdk (φ
′) − 1 | f
φ′
S
log f
φ′
S
2f
φ′
S
log f φ
′
S
)
nl ≤ exp
(
sdk (φ
′) | 2f φ
′
S
log f φ
′
S
)
K1nl lognl ≤ exp
(
sdk (φ
′) − 1 | 2K1 f
φ′
S
log f φ
′
S
22f
φ′
S
log f φ
′
S
)
K1nl lognl ≤ exp
(
sdk (φ
′) | 4K1 f
φ′
S
log f
φ′
S
)
K1nl lognl ≤ exp
(
sdk (φ
′) | f
φ
S
log f
φ
S
)
2K1nl lognl ≤ exp
(
sdk (φ) | f
φ
S
log f
φ
S
)
It only remains to establish the claim for the size of transition formulas. Since A
φ
s is nondeter-
ministic, formulas δ (q,a) are written in disjunctive normal form and for every direction x ∈ Sφ
each disjunct contains exactly one element of {x} × Q , where Q is the set of states in A
φ
s . As a
result, each formula δ (q,a) is of size
|δ (q,a)| ≤ |Q | |Sφ |(2|Sφ | − 1) + |Q |
|Sφ | − 1
≤ 2|Sφ | |Q |
|Sφ |
|δ (q,a)| ≤ 2H (φ) |φ | |S||Q | |S |

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